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Abstract
A new perspective is provided on the South African company law through the
comparative analysis of a shareholders’ remedy known as the Oppression Remedy
under section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and section 241 of the Canada
Business Corporations Act. Despite the introduction of the new Companies Act 71 of
2008, the statute still remains unclear as to the rights, duties and powers of each
individual within a company. In an aim to address this lack of clarity, this thesis takes a
“back-to-basics” approach by discussing the fundamental principles of corporate
personality and majority rule. This thesis provides a historical analysis of the English
company law, its influence on the South African company law as well as the
development of Canadian corporate law specifically through section 241. This study
analyses the English, South African and Canadian statutes, cases and secondary
materials.
KEYWORDS: company, corporate personality, corporation, director, judicial powers,
juristic personality, legal person, majority rule, oppression remedy, shareholder.
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INTRODUCTION
As of 1 May 2011, South Africa adopted its new Companies Act 71 of 2008.1 This new Act
is said to include provisions from various jurisdictions around the world. In 2004, the
Department of Trade and Industry in South Africa published a document on the South
African company law reform for the 21st century.2 The DTI policy document provides a
set of guidelines for the South African corporate law reform. One of the general
principles mentioned in the DTI policy document, is the harmonisation of company laws.
The policy document states two reasons for the importance of this general principle.
First, it reduces the costs and increases certainty both for overseas
companies and investors, and for our own companies involved in
international trade and investment. Secondly, it reduces costs involved in
the application of our company law, by enabling it to develop along the lines
and in the light of a great range of judicial precedent, practice and
commentary, making it practicable, minimising uncertainty... [However]
while the harmonisation of [the] new South African Company law with that
of international jurisdictions may be desirable, it may not always be
appropriate for South African conditions.3
In this case, however, the South African Legislature considered it appropriate to
incorporate the oppression remedy under section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act
which significantly resembles the Canadian oppression remedy under section 241 of the
Canada Business Corporations Act.4 The Canadian oppression remedy is known as “the
broadest, most comprehensive and most open-ended shareholder remedy in the
1

Companies Act, (S Afr), No 71 of 2008 [2008 SA Companies Act].

2

South African Company Law Reform for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform,
South African Department of Trade and Industry, Government Gazette No 26493 (June 2004)
(“the DTI policy document”).
3

Ibid at 29.

4

Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44 [CBCA].
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common law world.”5 Now that South Africa has adopted a similar provision, it is hoped
that South Africa will take advantage of its wide provisions, as it provides a much wider
scope than section 252 of the previous Act, Companies Act 61 of 1973.6
This thesis aims to provide an insightful, historical, comparative perspective on the
South African company law within the context of section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies
Act. The analysis is provided with specific reference to English company law as well as
Canadian corporate law. English company law is the common foundation between the
two jurisdictions, South Africa and Canada. This thesis will be articulated within the
context of the following cases, Foss v Harbottle7, North-West Transportation Company v
Beatty8, Burland v Earle9, Salomon v Salomon10 and Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd
& Others11. The historical perspective includes a comparison of the fundamental
principles of corporate or juristic personality and majority rule within the South African
company law and the Canadian corporate law. This thesis is set out in five chapters.
Chapter 1: Types of Corporations. This chapter discusses the various types of
corporations that have existed over the years and provides the foundation for the
analysis undertaken in Chapter 3. Chapter 1 addresses the distinction between the
5

820099 Ontario Inc. v Harold E. Ballard Ltd (1991), 3 BLR (2d) 113 citing Stanley M. Beck
"Minority Shareholders' Rights in the 1980's”.
6

Companies Act, (S Afr), No 61 of 1973 [1973 SA Companies Act].

7

Foss v Harbottle (1843), 67 ER 189.

8

North-West Transportation Company Limited v Beatty [1887] 12 AC 589 HL (Eng).

9

Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 HL (Eng).

10

Aron Salomon v A Salomon and Company Limited [1897] AC 22 HL (Eng) [Salomon v Salomon].

11

Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd & Others [1973] AC 360 HL (Eng).
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terms “company” and “corporation”, and considers the importance of this distinction
and the impact of the interpretation or common understanding of these terms has had
on the development of the South African company law within the context of its new
oppression remedy.
Chapter 2: The History of the South African company law and Canadian corporate law.
This chapter provides the historical development of the South African company law and
considers where South African company law stands in regards to the interpretations of
the following fundamental principles, corporate personality and majority rule.12 This
chapter also considers the history of the Canadian corporate law in regard to what led
to its reform in 1975.
Chapter 3: The Predicament- English company law. Chapter 3 identifies the
predicament, how it was created and its effect on the South African company law. This
chapter analyses the interpretation of the fundamental principles that have contributed
to the creation and understanding of the Canadian oppression remedy. This analysis is
made with specific reference to the judgments in Foss v Harbottle, North-West
Transportation Company v Beatty, Burland v Earle, Salomon v Salomon and Ebrahimi v
Westbourne Galleries Ltd & Others.
Chapter 4: The Oppression Remedy. This chapter provides a detailed comparison
between the specific provisions under the oppression remedy in both jurisdictions,

12

In this thesis, reference made to “fundamental principles” will mean the principle of corporate
personality and majority rule.
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Canada13 and South Africa.14 This chapter addresses aspects of the Oppression Remedy
which seeks to assist South Africa in the interpretation of its own section 163 of the
2008 SA Companies Act.
Chapter 5: Solving the Predicament. The solution to the Predicament is clarity of the
statute and subsequent application of the statute, therefore, this chapter provides
various recommendations, through proposed statutory amendments to the 2008 SA
Companies Act as a solution to the Predicament.
This thesis seeks to contribute to the further development of the South African company
law by proposing amendments to the 2008 SA Companies Act. This thesis aims to
provide better protection for South African shareholders as well as to provide clarity on
the fundamental principles that have governed the South African company law over the
years.

13

CBCA, supra note 4 at s241.

14

2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 1 at s163.
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Chapter 1: Types of Corporations
Introduction
As one considers the similarity or resemblance between section 163 of the South African
Companies Act 71 of 200815 and section 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act16,
the question often raised, is whether there is a difference between the terms
“company” and “corporation”. This chapter aims to clarify this question through the
analysis of the history or origin of these terms and their effect on minority shareholders
protections.

1.

The Corporation vs. the Company

Although the words “corporation” and “company” are sometimes used interchangeably,
their differences are significant within the context of their history.17 The difference
between the terms is not only historically relevant but also currently relevant. Canada
uses the term “corporation” whereas South Africa uses the term “company”. This was
not always the case in South Africa; the concept of a corporation was introduced
through the Roman-Dutch Law. The concept was found in the term universitas
personam,
[An] universitas personam in Roman Dutch law is a legal fiction, an
aggregation of individuals forming a persona or entity…[An] universitas is
15

Companies Act, (S Afr), No 71 of 2008 [2008 SA Companies Act].

16

Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44 [CBCA].

17

Christopher C Nicholls, Corporate Law (Emond Montgomery, 2005) [Corporate Law] at 5.

6

distinguished from a mere association of individuals by the fact that it is an
entity distinct from the individuals forming it, that its capacity to acquire
rights or incur obligations is distinct from that of its members, which are
acquired or incurred by the body as a whole and not for the individual
members…The main characteristics of [an] universitas, therefore, are the
capacity to acquire certain rights as apart from the rights of the individuals
forming it and perpetual succession. 18

Despite the Roman-Dutch law introduction of the term corporation, the influence of the
Roman Dutch law did not last in the South African company law. In the 18th and 19th
centuries, South Africa found the Roman Dutch law on commercial principles
inadequate, and sought the development of the English company law instead.19 English
company law has been part of South African law since 1861, 20 and that is where South
Africa acquired the use of the term “company”.

Let us now consider the word

“corporation”.
The word “corporation” has often been considered in the context of a large entity
existing to make a profit, however “the popular modern tendency to associate the word
‘corporation’ almost exclusively with profit making entities obscures an important
fact.”21 The corporation is a “concept that may be (and historically invariably was)
understood quite apart from the profit making commercial enterprises that are

18

JTR Gibson & RG Gibson, South African Mercantile and Company Law, (4th ed) (Cape Town:
Juta & Company Limited, 1977) at 285.
19

Steven D Girvin, “The Antecedents of South African Company Law” Vol 13 No.1 Journal of
Legal History (Frank Cass: London, 1992) 63-77 at 69-70.
20

DTI policy document, supra note 2 at para 2.1 citing the Cape Colony Joint Stock Companies
Limited liabilities Act, (S Afr), No. 23 of 1861.
21

Corporate Law, supra note 17 at 2.
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operated in corporate form today.”22 A corporation is defined as follows in the Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles,
corporation n. (15c) An entity (usu. a business) having authority under law to
act as a single person distinct from the shareholders...a group or succession
of persons established in accordance with legal rules into a legal or juristic
person that has a legal personality distinct from natural persons who make it
up, exists indefinitely apart from them, and has a legal powers that its
constitution gives it. – Also termed corporation aggregate; aggregate
corporation; body corporate; corporate body. 23

Today, Canada uses the term “corporation” in its corporate law statute, whereas South
Africa mainly uses the term “company” within its statute. The difference between the
two terms is based on how they were created. It is important to note that the
association of the word “company” does not imply a profit- venture.24 The word
“company” was in fact used regularly when describing an unincorporated partnership25,
the modern English business corporation has evolved from the
unincorporated partnership, based on mutual agreement, rather than from
the corporation, based on a grant from the state, and owes more to
partnership principles than to rules based on corporate personality. Thus,
we in England still do not talk about business corporations or about
corporation law, but about companies and company law. 26

22

Ibid.

23

CT Onions, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Vol 1 A-M 3d ed
(London UK: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1959) sub verbo “corporation”.
24

Corporate Law, supra note 17 at 6.

25

An unincorporated partnership was another word for a business organisation; a business
organisation is not a separate legal entity.
26

Corporate Law, supra note 17 at 6 citing L.C.B Gower, “Some Contrasts Between British and
American corporate law” (1956) 69 Harv L Rev, 1369 at 1371-72.
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Therefore, the distinction between the terms “corporation” and “company” is based on
whether one existed through the grant from the state (“corporation”) or through an
unincorporated partnership by mutual agreement (“company”). The way the entity27
was created also affected the documents that governed that entity. For example,
corporations granted by the state were required to strictly comply with their governing
document, which was a statute. The existence of that corporation was derived from the
state and the statute was its governing document. By contrast, in a “company” created
by mutual partnership, the existence of the company was derived from the individuals
within the partnership.28 A company was not a juristic person. The individuals within the
company complied with their agreement, but if they wanted to amend it, they could do
so by mutual agreement, signed by all members in the company.29 This mutual
agreement was referred to as the governing document of the company and was known
as the memorandum and articles of association.
The governing documents contained the following: how the entity was governed, the
rules of the entity as well as the powers and the duties of particular individuals within

27

“entity” is referred to as a collective term for corporation and company in order to clarify the
distinction between the terms.
28

Partnership is used to describe a group of people who come together seeking a common goal
and in 1844, an Act came into force to regulate these partnerships or business organisations.
These business organisations were described as companies under that Act, the term “company”
was used regularly, and during that period of the 19th century, a company was known as just a
business organisation.
29

How many members were required to sign in order to effect an amendment to the mutual
agreement, also the known as the memorandum and articles of association, was determined in
the mutual agreement itself, usually, it required a special resolution. A special resolution was a
resolution of a meeting of the members which was voted on by three-quarters of the members
present at the meeting having the right to vote.

9

that entity, such as directors and shareholders. The important distinction between the
“company” and the “corporation” was their origin in relation to where each derived its
power, either from the statute or the mutual agreement. This aspect is elaborated upon
below, within the context of the various types of corporations.

2.

Corporation created by... Company created by...

In light of the distinction between the term “corporation” and “company”, it has always
been known, since as early as 1850, that a juristic person is a corporation and not a
company, “…it is quite true that a corporation aggregate is… altogether distinct from the
aggregate individual members, as much so as they are from the rest of her Majesty’s
subjects.”30 Various types of corporations have been acquired from the 1800’s to 2012,
and the types of corporations differed in different jurisdictions.31
Before we proceed, we must first understand why we are considering the various types
of corporations. The importance of ascertaining the type of corporation will help us to
understand the type of governing document under that particular type of corporation,
which will ultimately lead us to determine whether adequate shareholder protections
were provided under that particular governing document.

30

James Grant, Grant on Corporations: A Practical Treatise on the Law of Corporations, (London,
UK: Butterworths Dublin, 1850) at 1.
31

Corporations have been acquired by partnerships or companies and natural persons all
seeking to obtain corporate personality for their business endeavours. For example a natural
person can apply to acquire a Letter Patent statute and a company can apply to acquire a special
Act of Parliament. Further discussion on the types of corporations is provided below.

10

In regard to the significance of different jurisdictions, consider the following. If South
Africa fits into one of the types of corporations and Canada another, the adequacy of
shareholder protections provided, if at all, under the provisions of the particular
governing document may differ in each country. Therefore, the manner in which the
courts enforce those rights under the particular governing document may also differ.
For example, in one jurisdiction, the courts may need to adhere to the statute, whereas
in another, the courts would consider the mutual agreement between the parties. A
shareholder seeking redress in each jurisdiction would obtain different relief because
the court would consider two different documents which were supposed to be applied
differently by the courts.32
It is therefore the aim of this thesis to find the bridge between these two jurisdictions in
light of South Africa’s newly adopted Canadian oppression remedy. Ascertaining this
“bridge” will enable South Africa to adequately seek guidance and to take full advantage
of the Canadian court decisions made under the Canadian oppression remedy.
Although the differences in the type of corporation are only theoretical, they
have a significant impact on the way a court decision is made as to which
cases, from a particular jurisdiction may be applied. A case from another
jurisdiction, for example England, is liable to be concerned with a different
type of corporate constitution. One needs to understand the different types

32

I say “supposed” because, although the governing documents were different, English courts
applied different principles drawn from one particular type of governing document and applied
it another type without regard to the duties owed by the individuals in a particular type of
corporation as well as to whom those duties were owed. Different principles were applied all
over the place, which led to an interesting predicament. This predicament is discussed further in
Chapter 3.
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in order to understand the case and to know whether it has any bearing on
the type of corporation with which you are concerned. 33

As mentioned above, the importance of considering how corporations are created is
further emphasised by South Africa possibly seeking guidance on the interpretation of
section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act. Section 163 “closely resembles the Canadian
oppression remedy under section 241 of the CBCA and it is possible that courts may also
look to Canadian cases for guidelines on the interpretation of certain parts of section
163.”34 Now that we have established the significance of considering the types of
corporation, I will now discuss the various types of corporations.
Corporations have been created in five different ways, by Royal Charter, by a special Act
of Parliament, by a Letters Patent statute, by registration of the memorandum and
articles of association, and by registration under a division of powers statute.

35

These

are the various ways juristic personality is acquired. Each type of corporation is
discussed with reference to how they are created and the powers obtained through the
governing document. How each type of corporation provides for relief in the event of
non-compliance with the governing document is also discussed below.

33

Bruce Welling, Lionel Smith & Leonard I Rotman, Canadian Corporate Law: Cases, Notes &
Materials, 4th ed (Markham: Lexis Nexis Canada Inc, 2010) [Cases, Notes and Materials] at 111.
34

Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2011)
[Henochsberg] at s12.
35

All, except for the division of powers statute, were established in the UK. The divisions of
powers statute was established in Canada.
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2.1

Royal Charter

Corporations created by Royal Charter, were created for a particular purpose, this
purpose would be expressly stated in the Charter. These corporations were created on
the discretion of the Crown and the powers of the directors and shareholders were
specifically identified in the Charter. In relation to non-compliance with the Charter,
“the common law of standing [would] determine whether a court [would] listen to the
particular person’s argument that someone else is not complying with the Charter.”36 An
example of a Charter corporation is the Hudson Bay Company.
The governing document in this type of corporation was the Charter granted by the
Crown. However, after 1688, the English system of Government underwent vast
restructuring, to the extent that the powers of the Crown to grant Charters were
restricted. It therefore became standard for Parliament to pass a statute authorising the
Crown to issue a Charter creating a corporation.37
2.2

Special Act of Parliament

The special Act of Parliament was created through a grant given to the particular person
requesting a corporation. For example, companies38 would form and apply for an Act of
Parliament. Similar to the Charter, the Parliament had the discretion to grant or refuse a

36

Cases, Notes and Materials, supra note 33 at 111.

37

Bruce Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles, 3d ed (London, Ont;
Scribbles Publishing, 2006) [Corporate Law in Canada] at 91.
38

These were the groups of individual seeking a common goal (business organisations or
partnerships).

13

request to establish a corporation. The source of power, for the directors and
shareholders rights, was derived directly from the Parliament and was provided under
the special Act of Parliament. The special Act of Parliament would provide directors with
the power to create by-laws to govern certain aspects of the corporation.39 The by-laws
had to comply with the provisions of the special Act of Parliament. In the event of noncompliance with the special Act of Parliament, “the grievance procedures [would have
been] provided explicitly in the special Act [of Parliament]. If not, a dissatisfied party
[would have to] rely on the general principles governing the situation…including the law
of standing.”40
The difference between the Charter and the special Act of Parliament, prior to 1688,
was that the Charter derived its power from the executive branch of government while
the source of power of the special Act of Parliament, was from the legislative branch.
After 1688, the source of power of the Charter was indirectly through the legislative
branch whereas the source of power for the special Act of Parliament was directly from
the legislative branch. An example of this type of corporation is found in the Foss v
Harbottle case.41 The corporation’s governing document was titled “An Act for
Establishing a Company for the Purpose of Laying Out and Maintaining an Ornamental
Park within a Township of Rushlome Charlton-upon-Medlock and Moss Side, in the

39

Cases, Notes and Materials, supra note 33 at 112.

40

Ibid.

41

Foss v Harbottle (1843), 67 ER 189.
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County of Lancaster”. The governing document in this type of corporation is the special
Act of Parliament.
2.3

Letters Patent statute

In the case of corporations created by Letters Patent, if an application to acquire a
corporation was granted by the Legislature, the corporation was created and its
governing document was the Letters Patent statute. Similar to the Charter “a letters
patent corporation is one incorporated under the registration statute that adopts the
charter corporation as its model”.42 This type of corporation was used in Canada until
the early 1970’s. Today, the only Canadian province that retains this type of corporation
for business purposes is Prince Edward Island.
The fact that the corporation was created by a Letters Patent statute meant that all
persons were bound by the provisions of the statute, to the extent to which the person
dealt with the corporation. The powers of the directors and shareholders were set out
expressly in the statute, for example, by-laws could be created by the directors, and
“the usual technique [was] to grant managerial power to the board of directors.”43
However, this was not the case in the contractarian type of corporations, which is

42

Corporate Law in Canada, supra note 37 at 91.

43

Cases, Notes and Materials, supra note 33 at 113.
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discussed below. Furthermore, in the event of non-compliance with the Letters Patent
statute, the provision of the statute itself would dictate the recourse available.44
2.4

Registration of Memorandum and Articles of Association, the

Contractarian or English statute model
A corporation created by registration of its memorandum and articles of association is a
corporation by virtue of the registration itself.45 Once the memorandum and articles of
association were signed and filed with the Registrar, a certificate of incorporation was
issued and the corporation could commence business as a juristic person.
As mentioned earlier, a company is not a juristic person. Only a corporation is a juristic
person, separate from its members. Over the years the distinction has blurred and
caused some confusion. Below is a discussion of the origin of the term “company”.
The word “company” has “no strict meaning; the term implies an association of a
number of people for some common purpose.46 With reference to the unincorporated

44

“In general, letters patent statutes do not provide for grievance procedures to correct or
restrain violations of the corporate constitution.” (Cases, Notes and Materials, supra note 33 at
113).
45

Over the years this type of corporation has been referred to as a company, but as was
discussed in paragraph 1 above, a company was not a juristic person. Today however, English
company law and South African company law refer to a juristic person as a company. This, as
will be seen in the following chapters, has led to some confusion within the company law.
46

L C B Gower, The Principles of Modern Company Law 3d ed (Stevens & Sons; London UK, 1969)
[Modern Company Law] at 3.
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partnerships, mentioned earlier, the registered companies47 were derived from these
unincorporated partnerships during the 18th century.
Initially, during the 17th century and the early 18th century, prior to the South Sea
bubble, in 1720, the only way to obtain corporate personality was from the methods
stated above, by Charter, by a special Act of Parliament or by a Letters Patent statute.48
These methods were all quite expensive, so the business world tried to adapt the
partnership form to an organisation with a large and fluctuating membership, this
combination was known as a quasi- partnership or unincorporated partnerships.49
These partnerships were governed by deeds of settlement. A deed of settlement was a
cross between the articles of association and a debenture trust deed. In terms of the
deed of settlement, the subscribers agreed to be associated in an enterprise with a
prescribed joint stock divided into a specified number of shares; under the deed,
management would be delegated to the committee of directors.50
The period of the South Sea Bubble and the enactment of the Bubble Act were marked
by corruption and illegality in relation to the partnerships and companies.51 In 1844, the
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Registered companies were companies that registered their memorandum and articles of
association under the Companies Act, 1862 (UK), 25 & 26 Vict c 89.
48

Modern Company Law, supra note 46 at 24.

49

Modern Company Law, supra note 46 at 4.
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of this thesis.
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Joint Stock Companies Act52 was enacted to regulate these partnerships and provide
them with some legal personality. These large partnerships were called joint stock
companies. These companies were registered with their memorandum and articles of
association which were in fact merely the registrations of their deeds of settlement.53
However, it was always known that a company was not a corporation in its complete
sense because it did not have limited liability.54 The liability of members under the joint
stock company remained with unlimited liability, just as a partnership. The definition of
a joint stock company under 1844 Companies Act confirms its partnership origin.
And be it enacted, That this Act shall apply to every Joint Stock Company...
and that the Term “Joint Stock Company” shall comprehend, - Every
Partnership whereof the Capital is divided into Shares, and so as to be
transferrable without the express Consent of all the Copartners.55
In 1862, the Companies Act, 186256 was enacted and provided that the memorandum
and articles of association would bind the company and the members. The statute
stated that,
The Memorandum shall bear the same stamp as if it were a deed and shall
be signed by each subscriber, in the presence of, and attested by one
52

Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict. c110) [1844 Companies Act].
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Corporate Law, supra note 17 at 12 citing Ronald Ralph Formoy, The Historical Foundations of
Modern Company Law (London UK: Sweet& Maxwell, 1923) at 41.
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Having corporate personality or being a separate legal entity meant that the assets and
liabilities of the corporations belonged to the corporations, separate from its members.
Therefore, a member in a corporation would not be liable for the debts owed by the
corporation; the members’ risk of investment is limited to value of his or her investment, his or
her shareholding in the corporation.
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witness at the least... it shall, when registered, bind the company and the
members thereof to the same extent as if each member had subscribed his
name and affixed his seal thereto, and there were in the Memorandum
contained, on the part of himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, a
covenant to observe all the conditions of such Memorandum subject to the
provisions of this Act.57
This provision established that the registered memorandum of association and articles
of association formed the contract between the company and the members or
shareholders. This contract was based on the deed of settlement that was originally the
document that governed the partnership.58
Therefore in this type of corporation, the shareholders were the theoretical source of all
power within the governing document and the directors were not usually given
managerial powers by the statute. If the directors had any such powers, they were
delegated by the shareholders, in accordance with the Articles of Association.59 In
relation to non-compliance with the Articles of Association, the position was uncertain
and created difficulty in the application of minority shareholder provisions and it seems
that it still creates difficulties in the application of minority shareholder provisions.
These difficulties are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
The difference between the Letters Patent statute and the contractarian statute was
“the retention of the discretionary element in the creation of the corporation. Letters
patent statutes always provided that the relevant governmental official ‘may’ issue the
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incorporating [governing] documents, while the contractarian…statutes state ‘shall’.”60
This meant that anyone who registered his or her memorandum and articles of
association obtained a corporation. Provided that all requirements were met, the
Registrar was statutorily obligated to grant the corporation. In the case of a corporation
created by a Letters Patent statute, the Civil Servant could decide whether or not to
grant the application for corporation despite compliance with the requirements. In the
case of non-compliance with the governing document in the contractarian statute,
English precedents were often considered in this regard.61
Throughout this particular type of corporation, reference has been made to
partnerships, corporate personality (juristic personality), corporations and how
companies are not juristic persons. The apparent misunderstanding between the
partnerships

and

corporate personality was created through various legal

interpretations and statutory wording. South Africa adopted this type of corporation
through the English company law. I elaborate on this aspect in Chapter 2.
2.5

Division of Powers statute

Until the early 1970’s, when the Canadian corporate law underwent major reforms,
Canadian corporations were mainly governed by Letters Patent statutes. In Canada
today, a corporation may be created by any of the provincial statutes or under the
60
61

Cases, Notes and Materials, supra note 33 at 113.

Although Canadian corporate law mainly grew from a Letters Patent statute, some Canadian
provinces had corporations created under a contractarian statute and for those types of
corporations, Canadian courts would seek guidance from English precedents (Cases, Notes and
Materials, supra note 33 at 113). The types of corporations within the Canadian jurisdiction are
discussed in Chapter 2.
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federal corporate statute. Each province has its own corporate legislation and each
province has a particular type of corporation. 62 Prior to the 1970’s reform Manitoba,
New Brunswick, Ontario and Prince Edward Island were the common law provinces
where incorporation took place by way of a Letters Patent statute.63 The provinces that
had a history of the contractarian statute were Alberta, British Columbia,
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan.64
Today, the only provinces that retain their original statutes are Prince Edward Island,
Nova Scotia and to a certain extent British Columbia. The rest of the provinces now
follow a division of powers statute, by adopting provisions from the Canada Business
Corporations Act (“CBCA”) into their own provincial corporate law statutes.
The division of powers statute is characterised as a CBCA type of statute which is
established when the corporation is created by filing its articles of incorporation under a
model of division of powers.65 The filing of the articles of incorporation “invokes a
statutory division of powers among the participants- directors, officers, shareholders
and, to a limited extent, creditors- in the internal workings of the corporation.”66 The
governing documents in this model are the articles of incorporation. In comparison to
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Quebec is excluded as the province applies Quebec law which is not within the scope of this
thesis.
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J L Stewart, Handbook on Canadian Company Law, 5th ed (Toronto: The Carswell Company
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the contractarian type of corporation, the governing document under this model does
not form a contract between the company and the shareholders.67
Now that we have identified some characteristics of the five types of corporations, we
now know that Canada comes from a Letters Patent statute and South Africa, through
its historical relationship with English company law, adopted a contractarian statute. Let
us therefore proceed to the historical development of the corporate law in Canada and
South Africa.

Conclusion
As South Africa will seek guidance from the Canadian courts on the interpretation of
section 163 of 2008 SA Companies Act, it is important to understand Canada’s corporate
law history. The historical analysis will lead us to understand why certain court decisions
were made under section 241 of the CBCA and why this section was created. Chapter 1
provided the foundation of this understanding by identifying the terms “corporation”
and “company”. This led to the discussion on the particular types of corporations and
their significance.
Ascertaining the type of corporation is important because it determines the source of
the corporation’s power. The source of corporation’s power could be from the Crown,
the Legislature or in the case of the contractarian statute, the shareholders. These
governing bodies determine the provisions within the corporation’s governing
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Corporate Law in Canada, supra note 37 at 60.
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document and through these provisions they identify the rights and duties of the
individuals within the corporation.
The rights provided in the governing document are what the shareholders seek to
enforce when obtaining relief on non-compliance of these governing documents. This
leads us to determine the adequacy of the shareholder protection within the particular
governing document. In Chapter 2, I delve into the history and current development of
the South African company law as well as the history of the Canadian corporate law and
the development of the oppression remedy under section 241 of the CBCA.
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Chapter 2: The History of the South
African Company Law and the
Canadian Corporate Law
Introduction
South Africa and Canada share a history in English company law. Their common
foundation is based on how each has developed its own shareholder remedies from
section 210 of the 1948 UK Companies Act.68 Considering the discussion on the different
types of the corporations in Chapter 1, understanding how each jurisdiction developed
from the same shareholders’ remedy with the different types of corporation is
fascinating. South African companies developed from contractarian statutes and Canada
developed from a Letters Patent statute. As of May 2011, South Africa adopted a new
shareholders remedy, one that resembles the Canadian oppression remedy.

The

question to consider is whether, the different types of corporations in each jurisdiction
will affect the way section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act is applied in South Africa.
This chapter begins with the history of the South African company law, the statutory
provisions under the old South African company law statute- the predecessors of the
2008 SA Companies Act- will be discussed. In addition, the chapter will consider the
impact the type of corporation in South Africa has had on its development. Lastly, this
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Companies Act, 1948 (UK), 11 & 12 Geo VI c.38 [1948 UK Companies Act].
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chapter will discuss the development of the Canadian corporate law, with emphasis on
the development of the oppression remedy.

1.

History of the South African company law

Company law has existed in South Africa since 1861 and has consistently followed the
English company law69 beginning with the Joint Stock Companies Act of the Cape
Colony.70 The Cape Colony Act was essentially a replica of the 1844 Companies Act.71
During the 19th century, South Africa was divided into colonies and each colony was
governed by its own company regulations, similar to Canada’s provinces.
After South Africa became a Union in 1910, it adopted its first national company law,
the Union Companies Act, 1926.72 The statutory member’s remedy was provided under
section 111bis of the 1926 Union Companies Act. The purpose of this section was to
provide alternative relief to winding up, in cases of oppression.73
After tracing the history of section 111bis of the 1926 Union Companies Act, the Judge in
Bader v. Weston concluded that,
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H R Hahlo, The South African Company Law Through the Cases (Cape Town: Juta & Company
Limited, 1977) at 10 [South African Company Law].
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Ordinarily, if there was a case of oppression within the company, the only relief available was
to liquidate the company, which meant that the company would no longer exist. Instead of this
final ending to the existence of the company, this section was created as an alternative to
liquidation. However, the remedy under the section could only be provided if one could show
that on just and equitable grounds, the company had reached the point where it needed to be
dissolved.
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[t]he section had been intended essentially as an alternative remedy
available only to persons who would otherwise have been entitled to an
order for the winding-up of a company upon the just and equitable
ground[s].74
Although the Union Companies Act came into force in 1926, the alternative remedy to
winding up was introduced in 1950, as an amendment to the 1926 Union Companies Act
under the Companies Act 37 of 1950.75 The wording of the section makes it clear that
the section was derived from section 210 of the 1948 UK Companies Act.76 The English
company law was incorporated into the South African company law; not only did South
Africa adopt English company law provisions but it also relied heavily on the cases
decided under the various English company law statutes.
The 1926 Union Companies Act was later repealed by the South African Companies Act
61 of 1973.77 The 1973 SA Companies Act was hailed as the first company law statute
that finally cut the umbilical cord between South African and English company law. 78
Despite South Africa’s aim to part from the English company law, it continued to
influence the South African company law, “it is true that the new Act [1973 SA
Companies Act] continues to be based on the English company law principles”.79 These
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general principles referred to above, include principles of corporate personality and
majority rule.
“The strongly felt need to strengthen shareholder democracy and provide more
effective protection for the small investor motivated many of the reforms in the 1973
Act”.80 Today, with reference to the DTI policy document, shareholder protection was
also one of the motivating aspects of the 2008 SA Companies Act. Before we discuss the
2008 SA Companies Act let us first consider South Africa’s position on the fundamental
principles of corporate personality and majority rule.
In South African company law, the nature and extent of the enforcement of the
shareholder remedy is dependent on three factors, (i) separate legal personality, (ii)
majority rule and (iii) the non – interference principle.81 These factors will be discussed
below within the context of the South African statutory provisions and South African
cases as well as the arguments made in Chapter 1 relating to types of corporations.
1.1

South Africa: Statutory Analysis

The South African company law falls into the category of corporations created by
registration of memorandum and articles of association, the contractarian statute. As
discussed in chapter 1, this type of corporation is identified through the particular
“contract” provision within the statute. In order to provide an overall understanding of
the South African company law position, an example is provided.
80
81
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MS Blackman, Law of South Africa Vol 4 (2) Part 2 (Durban: Butterwoths, 1995) [LAWSA] at
para 189.

27

The Yuri Example82 Let us assume that there is a person in a coma named Yuri. Before
he fell into the coma, Yuri left a document with the hospital stating how he wanted his
affairs to be handled in his absence (“the Document”).
In the first scenario, Yuri was diligent and thought ahead. In the Document he stated the
responsibilities of the individuals he wanted handling his affairs. He identified Ben to do
certain tasks. He also identified Ruth and provided her with certain tasks as well. Soon
thereafter Yuri fell into a coma.
In the second scenario, Yuri was under pressure and was not able to identify the
individual’s tasks as clearly as the first scenario. Luckily, Yuri knew that Ben, his friend,
had a document of his own that set out how Yuri’s affairs would be handled if a case like
this should arise. Yuri simply stated in his Document, that “If anyone wishes to see how I
have chosen to have my affairs handled, please refer to Ben’s Document.” Soon
thereafter Yuri fell into the coma.
Consider that Yuri represents the Corporation, the Document represents the statute,
Ben and Ruth represent the shareholders and the directors respectively. The first
scenario illustrates a corporation created by a Letters Patent statute or a special Act of
Parliament and the second scenario illustrates a corporation created by a contractarian
statute. South Africa falls into the second scenario.
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The lack of clarity as to who is responsible for what as well as the lack of distinction
between the Yuri’s rules regarding his affairs and Ben’s intentions regarding Yuri’s affairs
creates interpretation problems when this is considered in the corporate law context.
The shareholders’ wishes and the company’s wishes are all intertwined in one
document, the memorandum and articles, but this does not mean the company and
shareholders are the same. Ben’s wishes and Yuri’s wishes seem to exist simultaneously
within Ben’s Document (2nd Document): it should be clear that despite this, Yuri and Ben
are two different people.
In the context of South Africa, the shareholders and company are seen as separate, only
because of the clarity provided in the well-known case of Salomon v Salomon. The case
had clarified the position regarding corporate personality in the case of corporations
created by the contractarian statute. The Salomon v Salomon case held that a
corporation created in this manner is separate from its members. If it were not for the
clarity in Salomon v Salmon the section of the Act would leave one uncertain about the
nature of this type of corporation. The ambiguity in the wording of the statutory
provision is clear below. In the context of the South African company law, section 65(1)
of the 1973 SA Companies Act provides the following.
From the date of incorporation stated in the certificate of incorporation, the
subscribers of the memorandum together with such other persons as may
from time to time become members of the company, shall be a body
corporate with the name stated in the memorandum, capable of exercising
all the functions...

29

This provision states clearly that the shareholders (subscribers) are the corporation.
They are the same person. In another statutory provision, the legislature allows a
binding contract between the company and shareholder. This statute- based contract is
found under section 65 (2) of the 1973 SA Companies Act,

The memorandum and articles shall bind the company and the members
thereof to the same extent as if they respectively had been signed by each
member, to observe all the provisions of the memorandum and of the
articles, subject to the provisions of this Act.
This statute-based contract is the main characteristic of the contractarian statute. The
provision was first created in the 1862 Companies Act and due to South Africa’s
relationship with English company law; it also adopted this same provision. The original
wording of the section and the history of the section as to why the provision was
inserted into the statute is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. For now, let us
return to the ambiguity of the provisions and its effect on the interpretation of the
principles of corporate personality ad majority rule in the South African company law.83
2.2

South Africa: Corporate Personality

A corporation is a person in the legal sense of the word. As such, it is a legal
entity altogether separate and distinct from its members. Its existence is
independent of the continued existence of its members; and it is capable of
having rights and incurring obligations apart from those of its members.
Corporations are usually referred to as “juristic” persons to distinguish them
from human beings, or “natural” persons.84
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Where necessary I will apply the second scenario of the Yuri example in order to provide
clarity.
84

LAWSA, supra note 81 at Vol 4:1 para 18.

30

A corporation is a juristic person and how juristic personality is acquired has been
identified in South Africa in three main ways:85 by special Act of Parliament, such as
Eskom (incorporated by the Electricity Act 40 of 195886, replaced by the Electricity
Amendment Act 46 of 199487); by incorporation by an enabling act, for example, the
1973 SA Companies Act, and; by means of conducting oneself as a juristic person.88
The key corporate personality case in South Africa is Salomon v Salomon.89 The facts and
decision of Salomon v Salomon are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, but for the
sake of context, this case confirmed the concept of corporate personality or separate
legal personality in the “company” created under the contractarian statute.
South Africa has applied this case since 1920. The cases discussed below reflect South
Africa’s position on the corporate personality principle and also shows the difficulty or
uncertainty that still remains when applying this fundamental principle, especially in
cases of fraud. The facts and decisions of Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council and
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Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation and Another are discussed
below.
2.2.1 Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council90
Dadoo registered a company, Dadoo Ltd, in the Transvaal with a share capital of 150
shares. Dadoo held 149 shares in the company and 1 share was held by Dindar. Both
Dadoo and Dindar were “Asiatics”.91 In March 1915, the company obtained transfer of
Stand 340 in the township of Krugersdorp from Spiller (this title contained no restrictive
condition). In May 1916, the company obtained transfer of Stand 171 in the same
township, from Fouchee and Howell. The deed of transfer embodied a condition which
prohibited the owner from transferring or subletting the land, to any coloured person.92
The company thereafter leased both Stands to Dadoo. Dadoo carried on a grocery and
general dealer’s business on Stand 340 and he lived on Stand 171. In October 1919, the
Krugersdorp Council made an application and obtained an order setting aside both
transfers as being contrary to law. The appellant argued that the Council did not have
standing93 and there was no illegal evasion of the law.
The question before the court was whether ownership by the company was in
substance ownership by the shareholders. In response to the trial court decision, the
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Supreme Court (“the court”) said that the spirit and intent of the legislature exists only
in the context of the provisions of the statute.94 The court further held that to use this
approach would be difficult and dangerous.
I know of no case in which the expressed intention of the lawgiver has been
clothed with authority to affect a transaction which could not under ordinary
rules of construction be brought within the written statute.95 Such a
principle would be dangerous and difficult to apply to the meticulous
provision of the modern legislation. In this case the intention of the
Legislature is apparent upon the face of the clear definite language used,
and no further extension of it is warranted.96

The court then discussed the issue of corporate personality and applied Salomon v
Salomon. The court said that in law it is clear that property owned by Dadoo Ltd is not
the same as property owned by the shareholders.
This result follows from the principle of the separate legal existence with
which such corporations are by statute endowed, and the principle has been
accepted in our practice. In the words of LORD MACNAGHTEN (Salomon v
Salomon & Co., 1897 AC 22 at p 51), "the company is at law a different
person altogether from the subscribers to its memorandum; and though it
may be that, after incorporation, the business is precisely the same as it was
before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the
profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or a trustee
for them”.97
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The court was also aware of the difficulty in applying this principle. The court said that
the corporation could not be referred to as a coloured person like its shareholders;
therefore, Dadoo Ltd did not contravene the Act. The court also said that applying the
principle of separate legal personality in general, can get confusing, “[g]reat confusion
arises from distinguishing the body corporate for the individual members who at one
time constitute not the corporation, but all the members of the corporation.”98 A clear
example of this great confusion is in the dissenting judgment of the court by De Villiers J.
In the application of these facts to the law, De Villiers J combined both principles of
partnership with principles of corporate personality (separate legal personality), to
provide his judgment as follows.
Although a company has a legal persona distinct from its shareholders it can
hardly be denied that a company is in essence a partnership (of which the
shareholders are the partners) which the law clothed with the persona for
lawful purposes. 99
If we apply the Yuri example here, the Supreme Court had identified the principle of
corporate personality clearly, in that both Yuri and Ben are two different people.
However, the dissenting judgment of De Villiers J confuses the issue by interpreting the
concept of corporate personality incorrectly. The judge said that although Yuri and Ben
are different people, it cannot be denied that in fact Yuri and Ben are the same person,
but this is wholly inaccurate. Yuri is in a hospital bed and Ben is handling Yuri’s affairs,
similarly, the property was transferred to Dadoo Ltd, therefore the property belonged to
98
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the corporation and not its members; Dadoo only leased the property from Dadoo Ltd.
The principle of corporate personality is quite clear. However the lack of clarity, when it
comes to understanding separate legal personality or corporate personality, is based on
the contract characteristic of the contractarian statute. Therefore, even though the
intentions or wishes of Ben and Yuri regarding Yuri’s affairs are intertwined in one
document, it does not mean that Ben and Yuri are also intertwined as one person or
should be regarded as one person for any particular purpose. They are not. The next
case discusses the issue of fraud. Courts have found that there are instances, like fraud,
where the corporate personality of company may be disregarded. This is also inaccurate.
2.2.2 The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation100
The respondent carried on a business, inter alia, as the owner and charterer of ships. In
terms of a charterparty101 signed by the charterer in New Delhi, the President of India,
acting on behalf of the Government of India, chartered the vessel MV “Kavo Peiratis”
from Evdomon. The purpose of the charter was to carry a cargo of bagged rice from
Thailand to India. The vessel duly completed the voyage. The Government of India failed
to pay a portion of the freight due under the agreement and despite continuous
pressure from the managers of Kavo, it still owed US$109 962.47.
Two years later Evdomon ascertained that the MV “Vallabhbhai Patel” (“the vessel”)
was docked at the port of Saldahna Bay, where she had been undergoing repairs.
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Claiming the vessel belonged to the Government of India and in the belief that the
vessel was imminently due to depart, Evdomon attached the vessel in order to obtain
payment of the freight due under the agreement relating to Kavo. The vessel was
actually registered to the Shipping Corporation of India (“SCI”) and owned by SCI. SCI
therefore intervened in the application.102 SCI was a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Government of India. The question before the court was whether SCI’s property should
be treated as the Government’s property because of the status of SCI and its
relationship with the Government.103 With reference to the Dadoo case, the court held:
It seems to me that generally it is of cardinal importance to keep distinct the
property rights of a company and those of its shareholders, even where the
latter is a single entity, and that the only permissible deviation from this rule
known to our law occurs in those (in practice) rare cases where the
circumstances justify “piercing” or “lifting” the corporate veil. And in this
regard it should not make any difference whether the shares [are] held by a
holding company or by a Government. I do not find it necessary to consider,
or attempt to define, the circumstances under which the court will pierce
the corporate veil. Suffice it to say that they would generally have to include
an element of fraud or other improper conduct in the establishment or use
of the company or the conduct of its affairs. In this connection the words
“device”, “stratagem”, “cloak” and “sham” have been used...104
Courts in South Africa have found that there are instances that give rise to the situations
where corporate personality may be disregarded. In the well-known South African case
of Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Limited,105 the court proceeds
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to discuss the importance of corporate personality and the “piercing of the corporate
veil”.
It is trite law that “[a] registered company is a legal persona distinct from the
members who compose it”. Equally trite is the fact that a court would be
justified in certain circumstances in disregarding a company’s separate
personality in order to fix liability elsewhere for what are ostensibly acts of
the company. This is generally referred to as lifting or piercing the corporate
veil. (I shall confine myself to the use of the word piercing.) The focus then
shifts from the company to the natural person behind it (or in control of its
activities) as if there were no dichotomy between such person and the
company. In that way personal liability is attributed to someone who
misuses or abuses the principle of corporate personality.106
The Court has often held that in certain circumstances of fraudulent acts one could
disregard the corporate personality of the company and go after the shareholders.
Let us consider the Yuri example. If Ben acted fraudulently in regards to Yuri’s affairs,
the courts, based on the decision above, would say that it was appropriate to disregard
Yuri, as though he did not exist: again this argument is ridiculous.107 The courts would do
this in order to ensure that Ben was held accountable for his actions. But the problem
here is that one cannot disregard Yuri’s existence, he is in the hospital. The question
therefore, is how does one address the fraudulent conduct by Ben? Well, here is where,
the clarity of the Document becomes crucial.
Unless, Yuri stated how Ben will be dealt with if he steals from Yuri, there is no way of
holding Ben accountable because all his powers come directly from Yuri because Yuri
106
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adopted the 2nd Document as his own. There is therefore no cloak that Ben is
supposedly hiding behind; it all depends on detail, clarity and specificity in the
Document, i.e. the governing document of the corporation.

This responsibility of

providing statutory clarity, regarding the individual duties, rests directly with the
Legislature. In addition, the governing documents in all the various types of corporations
are the statutes, except for the contractarian statute, due to its statute based-contract.
In order to assist the South African Legislature I provide recommendations of statutory
provisions in Chapter 5 that will, if adopted, eliminate this issue of “piercing the
corporate veil” or disregarding the corporate personality. The issue of the interpretation
of corporate personality as well as issue of piercing the corporate veil are based on the
history of the terms “company” and “corporation” and their relationship with
shareholders. This relationship is captured in the binding contract between company
and shareholder. Lastly, issues relating to corporate personality stem from the
Legislature’s ambiguous language within the English company law, specifically, section
11 and 18 of the 1862 Companies Act which were adopted by the 1973 SA Companies
Act. These aspects are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
The next part of this discussion relates to majority rule. The majority rule itself is a fair
and strict principle but when the rule is applied to undefined or uncertain principles it
can lead to unfair results. Due to the lack of clarity when it came to the corporate
personality principle, the majority rule was applied to the rules governing the
corporation and it yielded the following results.
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2.3

South Africa: Majority Rule

When discussing majority rule in South Africa, the discussion begins with the often cited
case of Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Company.108 The Supreme Court of
Appeal in this case reiterated the majority rule, stating that:
by becoming a shareholder in a company a person undertakes by his
contract to be bound by the decisions of the prescribed majority of
shareholders, if those decisions on the affairs of the company are arrived at
in accordance with the law, even where they adversely affect his own rights
as a shareholder… that principle of the supremacy of the majority is essential
to the proper functioning of companies.109
This case was applied or referred to by various cases in the South African company law
especially within the context of shareholders’ remedies.110 A shareholder who sought a
remedy for a particular director’s conduct when the majority had already made a
decision on that conduct, needed to be aware of this majority rule. If the majority of the
shareholders made a decision which was unfair to the minority shareholders, the court
would often revert to the principle of majority rule and send the minority shareholder
back to have the matter decided by the majority shareholders.111 It was a consequence
of being a shareholder. The courts would often state that they could not interfere in the
internal management or affairs of the company, because majority decisions were part of
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the affairs of the company. The relationship between majority rule and court
interference is confirmed below.
Company law is based on the premise that within the framework of the
Companies Act, companies are self-governing republics in which the majority
should be allowed to govern unhindered by outside interference. From this
follows two basic rules: the ‘Non-Intervention’ Rule and the ‘Proper Plaintiff’
rule, both are subject to common law and statutory exceptions. 112
The internal management principle in South Africa113 is based on the case of Foss v
Harbottle114, which states, as a general rule, that the courts will not interfere at the
instance of an individual shareholder in matters of internal management. The internal
management principle denies the member an action against the company whenever the
result would be “that a meeting has to be called, and ultimately the majority [would get]
its wishes.”115 Other cases that applied the majority rule with the context of the
shareholders remedy are provided below.
2.3.1 Investors Mutual Funds Ltd v Empisal (South Africa) Ltd116
The facts of this case are briefly as follows: the minority shareholders of the first
respondent sought to prevent the meeting of the company from being held, where a
resolution authorising the sale of the company's assets, was to be passed by the
majority of shareholders, until the investigation by the Minister of Economic Affairs had
112
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been completed or for a period of three months (whichever was the sooner). With
reference to majority rule and the principle of non-interference, the court said that,
[i]t is a fundamental principle of company law that majority rule prevails... It
is a well-known principle that the Court will not normally intervene in the
internal domestic affairs of a company and will not enquire into the
commercial wisdom of a particular transaction which is left to the decision of
the shareholders. The Court will intervene only if it can be shown that the
minority shareholders are being unfairly prejudiced by the transaction... it is
clear that s 252 contains no provision empowering the Court to interfere
with the ordinary running of the business of a company by its directors or
controlling shareholders.117
The court proceeded to discuss what it would do if it were empowered to intervene by
section 252 of the 1973 SA Companies Act. The court would not allow the meeting to be
stopped, as requested by the minority shareholders, it would instead, order the
purchase of the shares of the company by the majority shareholders from the minority
shareholder at a fair price.118 Now that section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act
empowers the court to do much more, it is hoped that the interpretation of the majority
rule will not be a factor inhibiting the potential for better shareholder remedies.
This general rule of court non-interference is further reiterated in Porteus v Kelly119
where the court said that “the general rule is that the Court has no jurisdiction to and
will not interfere with the internal management of companies acting within their
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powers unless a fraud has been perpetrated upon the minority.”120 Majority rule as
stated in the Sammel case was applied in the following cases.121
2.3.2 Garden Province Investment v Aleph (Pty) Ltd122
The respondent in this case was a company that owned a building in the city of Durban.
The shareholders of the respondent company resolved to sell the building to a third
party at a fair and reasonable price under the circumstances. The minority shareholders
invoked section 252 of the 1973 SA Companies Act in an attempt to impeach the
transaction as being unfairly prejudicial, unjust and inequitable.
The court said that it was true that shareholders would be deprived of an investment
which the majority in number wish to retain, but this itself is not a result which is
necessarily prejudicial. Friedman J of the court added that this was merely the result of
being a minority shareholder in a company who takes a view of company policy different
from that of the majority. If one were to consider this instance as unfair and unjust then
it would mean that the wishes of the minority would override those of the majority.123
FRIEDMAN J said the following.
[I]t is true that shareholders will be deprived of the investment which the
majority in number wish to retain. But this in itself is not a result which is
necessarily prejudicial, unjust or unfair. It is, as I see it, a result which occurs
not infrequently and is the result of being a minority shareholder in a
company who takes a view of company policy different from that of the
majority. If one were to hold that this were true prejudice, injustice or
120
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inequity, the other side of the coin would be that because the minority in
number of shareholders wish as a matter of policy to retain the property
they can block the wishes of the majority shareholders who wish to sell it. As
I have said, when persons acquire shares in property holding companies as
minority shareholders they know they are minority shareholders and it
seems to me that it is not unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to them
to find their investment being sold against their wishes, provided of course
that it is done at a fair and realistic price.124
Similar to the Empisal case above, the courts will often adhere to the majority rule
despite the unfairness that may exist because it is a consequence of being a
shareholder. The court in the following case also applied majority rule. The difference in
this case, was that the court mentioned the partnership analogy of a company125.
2.3.3 Louw v Nel126

Louw, Nel and Du Preez had formed a partnership. In 2003, the partnership was
involved in certain projects with another, Mothupi. During that time, the partners
decided to implement a black economic empowerment policy. After negotiations, the
partners decided that the future business of the partnership should be conducted
through a company, which was subsequently formed. Over time, the relationship
between Nel and the others deteriorated, until a shareholders’ meeting was held and
the shareholder’s resolved, by majority vote, that Nel was to be removed as director of
the company on the alleged grounds that he had breached his fiduciary duty as a
124
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director, that he had stolen the company’s intellectual property, and that he had
conducted himself dishonestly and to the prejudice of the company.127 The court said
that,
generally speaking an application of this kind, based upon the partnership
analogy cannot succeed if what is complained of is merely a valid exercise of
the powers conferred on the majority. To hold otherwise would enable a
member to be relieved from the consequences of a bargain knowingly
entered into by him.
The bargain referred to by the court relates to the contract between the shareholder
and the company. Here it is clear that the both principles of corporation and partnership
are being applied.
The South African courts were already aware of three important points of company law,
when they made their decisions. First is the contract, the relationship that existed
between the company and shareholder. This contract coupled with the statutory
provision that members are the “company” meant that corporate personality principle
was left uncertain. Second, the majority rule would always be there to qualify any type
of action brought by a minority shareholder if it related to conduct that the majority
could do ordinarily in the course of its affairs. Lastly, the court would not interfere if the
conduct complained related to something that could be remedied through a general
meeting. These points of law represent where the South African law stands on these
fundamental principles of corporate personality and majority rule. It is these points of
law that need to be clarified for the South African company law to truly develop and
127
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provide shareholders with a proper remedy through section 163 of the 2008 SA
Companies Act.
If these fundamental principles are not clarified within the South African company law,
the uncertainty and confusion may be perpetuated when applying the shareholder
remedy under section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act. In fact, it has already begun. A
company law commentary published in November 2011 explained the application of
section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act.
The section is essentially intended as a statutory means of seeking redress,
given the common law position deriving from Foss v Harbottle. But this is not
to say, of course, that conduct by the majority, which constitutes a wrong to
the company necessarily constitutes conduct unfairly prejudicial or
oppressive to a shareholder within the meaning of section 163. 128

Although South Africa adopted a wide shareholders’ remedy from the Canadian
oppression remedy, it is clear, that its potentially wide remedy may be limited by
application of majority rule. The commentary argues that, if the majority shareholders
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done to the shareholders and if a minority shareholder disagrees then it is merely a
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Now let us consider how the Canadian corporate law developed from a Letters Patent
statute and section 210 of the 1948 UK Companies Act to create the oppression remedy
under section 241 of the CBCA.

2.

History of the Canadian Corporate law

Most of the Canadian provincial statutes used the Letters Patent model, but there were
other provincial statutes that used the contractarian statute.129 However, for most of
them this only lasted until 1975 when the federal corporate statute, known as the
Canada Business Corporations Act130 was enacted. The CBCA followed a division of
powers type of statute and most of the provinces adopted this model of a division of
powers. One of the main aspects of the division of powers model under the CBCA was
the wide shareholder remedy known as the oppression remedy. This type of remedy did
not exist in the Letters Patent or the contractarian type of statute. In fact as mentioned
in Chapter 1, one of the characteristics of the Letters Patent statute was that if the
remedy was not included in the statute, there was no recourse provided. In the
contractarian statute, the shareholder remedy was found in the English company law; in
fact, the first Canadian shareholder remedy was introduced in British Columbia131 in
1960 and took the form of a provision similar to section 210 of the 1948 UK Companies
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Act.132 Below is a discussion of how the Canadian corporate law developed from the two
types of statutes, Letters Patent and contractarian to the current division of powers type
of statute under the CBCA.

History of the Canadian Oppression Remedy
During the 1970’s, a committee was mandated to review Canada’s particular type of
statute, the Letters Patent statute, in comparison to the English company law. The
committee was also mandated to provide a proposal for the new Canadian Federal
corporate statute.133
The Proposal described as the Dickerson Report was published in 1971. It provided
drafted sections of a Proposed Federal Act, in each area of corporate law as well as
providing an extensive commentary on each provision and the reason for its insertion. In
reference to the oppression remedy, it stated that,
[t]he CBCA oppression remedy was substantially broader than its British or
British Columbia antecedents. The Dickerson Report was guided by its
conception of corporate law as a balancing of interests among shareholders,
creditors, management and the public, essentially ensuring adequate
investor protection and maximum management flexibility, if they were
given broad discretion to apply general standards of fairness. 134
While the Dickerson committee were drafting the Report they looked at the UK Cohen
and Jenkins reports for guidance on some statutory provisions. When the Report was
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completed, it was amended and in 1975, the Report formed a substantial part of the
provisions of the CBCA. 135 Soon after the CBCA was enacted the province of Alberta
decided to publish its own report on the changes to its statute known as the Alberta
Companies Act136, which was a contractarian type of statute. The Alberta Proposal was
published in 1980.137
Alberta had originated from a contractarian type of statute. In 1980 it chose to adopt a
division of powers statute based on the new 1975 CBCA. Although Alberta was not the
only province that amended its statute from a contractarian model to the CBCA type of
statute, it was the only province that documented its amendments and the reasons for
the amendments. In the Alberta Proposal, the reasons provided for the inclusion of the
oppression remedy provisions were drawn from the following reasons in the Dickerson
Report.
[The recommended provisions were made] to strip away the self-imposed
judicial qualifications that have limited the application of section 210 and
that have therefore cast considerable doubt upon the effectiveness of the
original provision. [The aim was] to set a standard that gave life to the often
cited case Elder v Elder and Watson138 “...the essence of the matter seems to
be that the conduct complained of should at the lowest involve a visible
departure for the standard of fair dealing, and a violation of the conditions
of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a
company is entitled to rely”. 139
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The “self-imposed judicial qualifications” mentioned above, relates to the reluctance of
the courts to interfere in the internal management of a corporation. “The complex
wording of the Canadian statutes was designed to get around the failures of the English
section.140 Canadian legislatures have recognised that it is difficult to create minority
rights that can be asserted against the majority.”141 These failures coupled with the selfimposed judicial qualification may be summarised here.
Judges adopted a hands-off approach, saying that they were powerless to
deal with the internal management of corporations. Ironically, their
attitudes were formed by principles that had nothing to do with the
individual shareholders rights; they had to do with a mistaken view of the
relationship between majority rule and corporate personality. 142
The mistaken view is an area that the South African company is already familiar, as
mentioned previously, in the history of the South Africa company law. When it comes to
applying the corporate personality principle, South African courts have admitted to the
confusion it creates and when it comes to the majority rule, the courts have shown their
reluctance to interfere in the internal management of the corporation. However, as of 1
May 2011, South Africa chose to develop its company law by adopting a division of
powers model, similar to the case with Alberta in 1980. Despite this development, South
Africa may still be faced with this mistaken view.
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Conclusion
South Africa has come from a contractarian statute, although today the 2008 SA
Companies Act follows a division of powers type of statute, clearly changes have been
made in order to move away from this contractarian statute. However, the principles
established under the 1973 SA Companies Act may seem to be applicable in 2012, but
this thesis will show that this is not true. The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate
the confusion that existed within the statutory provisions as well as the South African
cases and how this confusion ultimately affects the adequacy of the shareholder
remedy. It is clear from this chapter, that the position of the South African company law
on the principles of corporate personality and majority rule has been adopted through
the influence of English company law.
In light of the fact that Canada and South Africa share an English company law
background, let us consider what lead to the confusing view of the principle of
corporate personality and the majority rule.
The next chapter therefore considers the origin of this mistaken view, it identifies the
Predicament in detail and refers to key English cases such as Foss v Harbottle143, NorthWest Transportation Company v Beatty144, Burland v Earle145, Salomon v Salomon.146
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Chapter 3: The Predicament- English
Company Law
Introduction
Chapter 1 and 2, refer was to a legal misunderstanding, “great confusion” or a
“mistaken view” of the fundamental principles, corporate personality and majority rule.
In this chapter this mistaken view will be elaborated upon and referred to as the
Predicament. The Predicament originated in the English company law as far back as the
19th century and over the years has been adopted by South Africa company law. The
Predicament only exists in the type of corporation created by a contractarian statute.
The reason is because in a contractarian statute, the corporation derives its power from
a statute-based contract instead of the statute itself. This is the significant difference.
In order for South African company law to develop, this Predicament needs to be
clarified and addressed. After identifying the Predicament, the first step to addressing
this Predicament is to understand its origin, through English legislation and the English
precedents. This chapter discusses the Predicament through the 1844 Companies Act147,
the 1862 Companies Act148 and through the following cases Foss v Harbottle, NorthWest Transportation Company v Beatty, Burland v Earle, Salomon v Salomon.
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1.

The Predicament

The confusion created under the contractarian statute in the interpretation of corporate
personality and majority rule was based on the lack of clarity in the statute. The point of
reference for all corporations created over the years was the statute; the reason is that
the corporation exists through the power derived from the statute, the governing
document.149 The key is the statute expressly stated the rights and duties of the
individuals within the corporation.
In a contractarian statute, the statute-based contract shifts the shareholders’ and
directors’ powers, which are supposed to be derived directly from the statute, to
powers derived from the statute-based contract. Therefore, instead of seeking guidance
on how the company should be governed, from the statute; one seeks guidance from
the statute- based contract. Similarly in South Africa, the ambiguity in the contractarian
statute led to various confusing interpretations of corporate personality and majority
rule within the South African company law.
However, the Predicament is not about problems created in the method of
incorporation. It is in fact about the lack of attention given to the application of the
statutory provisions by the courts, when considering and applying the rights and duties
of the individuals in a corporation, a shareholder and a director. The major factor is the
lack of clarity in the statute regarding the duties of the individuals in a corporation.
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In South Africa, when discussing the rights and duties of each director or shareholder,
the first point of reference is the Memorandum of Incorporation 150, thereafter one
considers whether the provisions in the Memorandum of Incorporation comply with the
provisions in the statute.151 As discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, South African company law
developed from a contractarian statute and the wording of the statute led to legal
misunderstandings regarding corporate personality and majority rule which were drawn
from the English company law. However, it is important not to lose sight of the key
factor which is the lack of clarity in the statute regarding the powers of the individuals in
a company. In ascertaining the clarity of the statute and duties of the individuals in the
company, the questions to answer are: what is the duty or the power? And where is the
duty or power derived from i.e. is it statutory, is it common law or is it the law of equity?
South African company law was influenced by English company law. South Africa not
only adopted statutory provisions from English legislation but also adopted the
principles established under the common law system.152 Considering the law of equity,
South Africa adopted the principle that each director owes a fiduciary duty to the
company, for example, if there are five directors, each director within that group of five,
owes a fiduciary duty to the company. Therefore if we apply the questions above to this
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example, the answers would be as follows: the duty is the fiduciary duty, which is
derived from the law of equity and is owed to the company by each director.
The board of directors on the other hand, does not owe any fiduciary duty to anyone.
The statutory duty imposed on the board of directors is to manage the affairs of the
company.153 The board of directors is empowered by the statute to exercise its power to
manage the company’s affairs. The next step is to determine how this statutory power is
exercised by the board of directors.154 Firstly a meeting is held regarding a particular
matter or transaction; secondly, each director exercises his or her fiduciary duty towards
the company by casting his or her vote, and lastly, once each vote is cast, a decision is
made using majority rule. It is important to note that when ascertaining how each
director exercised his or her fiduciary duty, the courts of equity considered the
knowledge of each director in regard to that particular matter tabled at the meeting.
The point of this discussion is to illustrate that the key to the Predicament. If the courts
were to consider the questions above before delving into the analysis of the complex
facts before it, the South African company law will be become less complicated and
uncertain.
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If we accept that a company is a person created by statute then it is clear that the
statute is the point of reference.155 The existence of the company is derived from the
statute only. However, since 1973, the South African courts have not considered a
company from this perspective; the point of reference was the memorandum of
association and then the statute, instead of the statute and only the statute. Therefore,
if the statute is the only point of reference when determining the duties of the
individuals, it is crucial that the statute is clear regarding those duties, as the lack of
clarity affects how effective the shareholder remedy will be.
If a minority shareholder approached the court seeking redress for his or her exclusion
from the management of the company by the director defendant, the South African
courts consider manner in which the decision was made by the board of directors, the
board meeting, the procedure followed in the board meeting and the requirements for
granting relief.156 However, because a company is a legal person empowered by the
statute, the individuals are also bound by the statute; therefore the fundamental
question is what does the statute state regarding who has a duty to manage the
company’s affairs?
Section 66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act empowers the board of directors to manage
the affairs of the company. Therefore, the director defendant must then provide
evidence of the exercise of that statutory power of management. The evidence is
155
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provided through the exercise of his or her fiduciary duty owed to the company,
considering his or her knowledge as to why the minority shareholder should be
excluded. This is essentially a subjective exercise because the knowledge each director
possesses, differs.157 Therefore the facts of each case will differ in light of the knowledge
each director possesses when exercising his or her fiduciary duty that each director
owes to the company. In the case of a shareholder, a shareholder does not owe any
fiduciary duty towards the company.158
If there was no mention of who was empowered to manage the company’s affairs in the
statute, the South African courts sought other sources of law as points of reference. In
the 1973 SA Companies Act, the statute did not expressly empower the board of
directors to manage the affairs of the company. The board of directors was empowered
by the shareholders, by virtue of the shareholder’s powers of delegation. Despite being
bound by the statute the South African courts still considered other laws, laws of
partnership just as the English courts. This was essentially due of the statute-based
contract.
Therefore the Predicament exists where the point of reference when discussing a
company’s powers is not the statute but other sources of law, even though it is
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accepted that a corporation created by a statute, a corporation created under a
contractarian model is a legal person, meaning despite the existence of the statutebased contract the point of reference is still the statute. Let us now consider how this
Predicament was created in the English company law and thereby adopted by South
African company law. The first case that confirmed that a company is a legal person was
Salomon v Salomon, the court referred directly to the statute.

2.

English company law provisions: Salomon v Salomon

The corporation created by a contractarian statute has its origins in partnerships. As I
discussed in chapter 1, regarding the distinction between a “company” and a
“corporation”, a company, despite its current definition, has always been known as a
business organisation. A company is not a juristic person and this has been the position
since 1844. In 1844, the Joint Stock Companies Act came into force. The purpose of this
statute was to “allow the many different business organisations that had evolved after
the 1720 Bubble Act159, to legitimize their activities by registering under the statute. The
stated legislative plan was to turn them into ‘companies’ with some, but not all the
characteristics of ‘corporations’.”160 After the Bubble Act and the level of uncertainty
and corruption in the trade industry, business people were not sure of the nature of
business organisations that existed. The 18th century was “marked by an almost frenetic
boom in company flotations which led to the South Sea Bubble.” 161 Due to the cost and
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the long process of obtaining a corporation by Charter, or special Act of Parliament or by
a Letters Patent statute, business people opted to use charters from companies that
were not using their charters.
Most company promoters were not particularly fussy about whether they
obtained charters (an expensive and dilatory process), and those who felt it
desirable to give their project this hallmark of respectability found it simpler
and cheaper to acquire charters from moribund companies which were able
to do a brisk trade therein. [Therefore, this meant that] [a]n insurance
company acquired the charters of the Mines Royal and Mineral and Battery
Works, and a company which proposed to lend money on land in Ireland and
a banking partnership in turn acquired the charter of the Sword Blade
Company which had been formed to manufacture hollow sword blades. 162
The confusion created then, was that while one could identify a company’s business
from its name or its objects in the Charter, these transactions led one to be uncertain
about the nature of the company he or she was in business with. These transactions
were in essence illegal. In 1720, the Bubble Act was enacted and made the situation
worse by allowing the illegal activity to persist due to its lack of clarity as to what kinds
of businesses were illegal and which ones were not illegal according to the statute.
During the period between 1720 and 1844, there were a few unincorporated companies
and regularly chartered companies but not many due to the effect of the Bubble Act.
“The lasting effect of the Bubble Act and the crisis of 1720 was to make the Law Officers
of the Crown more chary of advising the grant of charters, and to insist on restrictive
conditions in those that were granted...It was not until towards the end of the century
with the growth of canal building which necessarily involved an application to the
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Parliament for special powers, that the Parliament became least strict in its
requirements and that direct statutory incorporation became common.”163 So, the 1844
Joint Stock Companies Act was therefore created to legitimise these business
organisations164. Section 25 of the 1844 Companies Act limited the company’s purpose,
to purposes stated expressly in the provisions of the Act.165 Even though the statute had
this characteristic of a corporation, the members were still liable for the debts of the
company.
It is clear that efforts were made to move this illegal company into a state of legitimacy
by conferring on it characteristics of a corporation. In 1855, the Legislature’s effort
continued. The 1855 Limited Liability Act166 came into force and limited members’
liability to “the portion of his Shares not paid up”167 thereby reducing the liability of
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shareholders provided under the 1844 Companies Act.168 In effect, the company was
looking more and more like a corporation.
However, in 1862, the Legislature seemed to take step back. The Companies Act 1862 169
was enacted, “and consolidated the two earlier statutes”.170 The cause of all the
statutory ambiguity was based on section 11 and 18 of the 1862 Companies Act.
11.
The Memorandum shall bear the same stamp as if it were a deed
and shall be signed by each subscriber, in the presence of, and attested by
one witness at the least... it shall, when registered, bind the company and
the members thereof to the same extent as if each member had subscribed
his name and affixed his seal thereto, and there were in the Memorandum
contained, on the part of himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, a
covenant to observe all the conditions of such Memorandum subject to the
provisions of this Act.171
18.
Upon Registration of the Memorandum of Association and Articles
of Association… the Registrar shall certify under his hand that the company
is incorporated. The subscribers’ of the Memorandum of Association,
together with such other persons as may from time to time become
members of the company, shall thereupon be a body corporate by the
name contained in the Memorandum of Association, capable of forthwith
exercising all the functions of an incorporated company.

These provisions were adopted by the South African company law statute, under section
65(1) and 65 (2) of the 1973 SA Companies Act. The provisions were also adopted in the
Canadian provincial statutes in Alberta172, British Columbia173, Saskatchewan174 and
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Nova Scotia.175 The Predicament is evident in these two provisions. Firstly, under section
18 of the 1862 Companies Act, the statute provided that the shareholders were the
corporation. This was not true. The corporation was a juristic person separate from its
shareholders. The second provision was the creation of the contract under section 11 of
the 1862 Companies Act. The inclusion of this section meant that the governing
document of the company was not the statute; it was the statute- based contract. The
statute failed to clarify that the source of the company’s existence was the statute (like
every other corporation), it was now the contract (which is a characteristic of business
organisations).
The requirement that the company, registered under the 1862 Companies Act, was to
be governed by a contract was familiar to companies due to their origin of partnership
or business organisations. Before the Legislature started to legitimise companies and
require registrations, companies were governed by their contracts. When the 1862
Companies Act came into force and provided for a contract between the company and
shareholders, it became familiar territory for these companies. The companies that
registered under the statute were now corporations. But this was not the way they were
viewed by the courts.
The significant aspect of statute-based contract was the contracts’ origin. Prior to the
registration of companies, when they were seen as business organisations or
partnerships, the document that regulated their partnership was called a Deed of
174
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Settlement. The Deed of Settlement was a written agreement between the parties
which was sealed and the seal ensured that the parties that agreed to the Deed of
Settlement were able to enforce their rights under the Deed in court. 176
In the 1862 statute, the Legislature simply adopted this deed of settlement. But the
existence of the contract did not negate the existence of the corporate personality of
the company. Despite this, courts saw these new corporations as mere partnerships.
The decisions of the courts below show that the concept of corporate personality has
been uncertain. The House of Lords in Aron Salomon v A Salomon and Company
Limited177 aimed to rectify or clarity the nature of the corporation of these companies.
In 1896, the courts in Salomon v Salomon sought to clarify the position regarding
corporate personality in these registered companies. The House of Lords held that the
Salomon Company was a juristic person, separate from its members. Let us review how
they arrived at this decision.
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Salomon v Salomon
The facts involved a sole proprietor named Aron Salomon who carried on business as a
boot leather manufacturer. Mr. Salomon wanted to incorporate a joint stock company.
Prior to incorporation Mr. Salomon and another (trustee of the future company)
entered into a preliminary agreement whereby the trustee agreed to buy and Mr.
Salomon agreed to sell his business. The consideration to be provided upon registration
of the company would be secured debentures issued to Mr. Salomon. The company was
registered in compliance with the 1862 Companies Act. In terms of the Memorandum of
Association, Salomon held 20001 shares and his wife and five children who had
subscribed for the shares in the company held 1 share each.
At the third meeting of directors, it was resolved that the seal of the company should be
affixed to debentures to be issued to Aron Salomon (in accordance with the agreement).
At the fourth meeting of directors, the 10000 debentures were sealed and delivered to
Aron Salomon. At the fifth meeting of directors, the resolution of the fourth meeting
was rescinded and the debentures were cancelled, however, at the same time, at the
meeting, they were issued to Edmund Broderip (“Broderip”). The issue was made as
security for the money lent to Aron Salomon of £5000.
Aron Salomon then lent the £5000 to the company at 10 per cent. The company later
defaulted on its payment to Aron Salomon which was in fact owed to Broderip. About
eight months later, Broderip gave notice to claim on the £10000 debenture security
from the Company, because to Broderip, Aron Salomon had defaulted on his payment.
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One month thereafter, the company was ordered to wind up, but because Aron
Salomon was a secured creditor under his agreement with the company he was paid
and no money was left for the other creditors. Broderip, as creditor, brought the
following application to court.
Court of Appeal Decision
The Court of Appeal struggled with the argument brought by Mr. Salomon, that he was
separate from the Salomon Company and that his conduct was not an effort to defraud
the creditors. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial court, that Mr.
Salomon should indemnify the company for the money owed to the creditors.178 The
following reasons were provided by Lindley LJ.
Lindley LJ’s reasons were accepted by the other judges of the court. He said that Mr.
Salomon’s scheme was a device used to defraud creditors; that the so called business
was a sham; and that the sale of business was a mere scheme to enable Mr. Salomon to
carry on business in the name of the Salomon Company in a manner contrary to the
intent and meaning of the 1862 Companies Act. The other judges of the court, Lopes LJ
and Kay LJ agreed with Lindley LJ’s decision and added that “[t]o legalize such a
transaction would be a scandal”179, Kay LJ added that “[t]he pretended sale to the
company was an utter fiction.”180 The decision of the Court of Appeal was as follows.
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Mr. Aron Salomon’s scheme is a device to defraud creditors...I regard the socalled sale of the business to the company as a mere sham, and... The Court,
being of opinion that the formation of the company, the agreement... and
the issue of debentures to Aron Salomon... were a mere scheme to enable
him to carry on business in the name of the company with limited liability,
contrary to the true intent and meaning of the Companies Act, 1862 and
further enable him to obtain preference over the creditors of the company
by procuring on first charge on the assets of the company by means of such
debentures, dismiss the appeal of Aron Salomon with costs.181
Aron Salomon appealed to the House of Lords.
The House of Lords decision
The House of Lords allowed the appeal of Aron Salomon and held that the Salomon
Company was separate from its members in terms of the 1862 Companies Act. Lord
Halsbury set out the following conclusions.
1. In order to determine the question of whether the artificial creation was validly
constituted in this instance, “it is necessary to look at what the statute itself has
determined in that respect... The sole guide must be the statute itself.”182

2. “[O]nce the company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other
independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself.”183

3. In response to the Court of Appeal decision that, “the formation of the company
was a mere scheme to enable Aron Salomon to carry on business in the name of
181
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the company.”184 Lord Halsbury said “I am wholly unable to follow the
proposition that this was contrary to the true intent and meaning of the
Companies Act. I can only find the true intent and meaning of the Act from the
Act itself; and the Act appears ... to give a company legal existence with rights
and liabilities of its own, whatever may have been the ideas or schemes of those
who brought it into existence.”185 This is a key point as South African courts have
sought to consider this, a valid reason to disregard the principle of corporate
personality.
4. In response to the decision of the trial court, that Aron Salomon had chosen to
employ the limited liability company as his agent,186 Lord Halsbury LC., said that
“either the limited company was a legal entity or it was not; If it was, the
business belonged to it and not Mr. Salomon; if it was not, there was no person
and no thing to be an agent to, at all.”187
Lord Macnaghten, added the following comments.

When the memorandum is duly signed and registered, though there be only
seven shares taken, the subscribers are a body corporate “capable
forthwith” to use the words of the enactment, “of exercising all the
functions of an incorporated company.” Those are strong words. The
company attains maturity on its birth. There is no period of minority – no
interval of incapacity. I cannot understand how a body corporate thus made
capable by statute can lose its individuality by issuing the bulk of its capital
to one person, whether he be a subscriber to the memorandum or not. The
184
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company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the
memorandum; and though it may be that after incorporation the business is
precisely the same as it was before, the same persons are managers... the
company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor
are the subscribers as members liable, in any shape or form except to the
extent and in the manner provided by the Act. That is I think the declared
intention of the enactment. 188
It is clear from the reasons provided by the Court of Appeal that the court struggled with
the concept of corporate personality applying in a case where only one man obtained a
corporation created by contractarian statute.189 The House of Lords clarified the
position by reiterating that the court was bound by the statute. Mr. Salomon had
complied with the all the requirements in the statute and therefore there was no
contravention of the law. The reason why the corporation was created was insignificant.
The Predicament, lack of clarity in the statute never existed in the other types of
corporations because, firstly they did not have a contract between the shareholders and
company and secondly the courts were bound by the provisions of the statute, the
corporation’s governing document. A clear example of this is in the Foss v Harbottle
decision.
This case serves two purposes in this thesis, firstly, it provides an example of a case
involving a corporation created by a special Act of Parliament and secondly, this case
forms an integral part of English company law and South African company law. Its
188
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significance is based on how the court addressed the fundamental principles of
corporate personality and the majority rule. The facts and decision will now be
discussed.
3.

Foss v Harbottle190

In September 1835, certain persons had thought of a plan to purchase about 180 acres
of land in Manchester. The land belonged to the defendant Denison. The plans included
enclosing and planting on the land in an ornamental and park-like manner and erecting
houses on the land with attached gardens and pleasure-grounds, as well as selling,
letting and disposing of the land. The Defendants, Harbottle, Denison and others agreed
to form a joint stock company191 for the purpose above.
In October 1835, the plans were prepared. Harbottle and others purchased portions of
the land from Denison with an aim to sell it at a profit. Two years later, Royal assent was
received for An Act for Establishing a Company for the Purpose of Laying Out and
Maintaining an Ornamental Park within a Township of Rushlome Charlton-uponMedlock and Moss Side, in the County of Lancaster.
For six years they continued selling property and complying with the special Act of
Parliament. Then, in October 1843, a bill (a type of pleading) was filed by two
shareholders on behalf of the company incorporated by the special Act of Parliament,
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and the other shareholders. The bill or pleading was made against the Defendants, five
of whom were directors of the corporation (Denison, Harbottle and three others).
The bill alleged that the Defendants were involved in various fraudulent and illegal
transactions, where the corporation’s property, was being misapplied and wasted.
These allegations were based on the Defendants’ actions, which included, selling the
property to others at exorbitant prices and retaining the profit, the misappropriation of
corporation funds, and raising money on behalf of the corporation, in a manner not
authorized by the special Act of Parliament.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the characteristics of the special Act of Parliament is
that the source of power of the rights of the directors and shareholders was derived
from the statute, the special Act of Parliament (“special Act”). The statute would also
often authorise directors to govern certain aspects of the corporation. The special Act
would entrust the directors with those powers.
The Plaintiffs in the case argued that due to the relationship of trust between the
directors and the corporation under the special Act, the corporation should not be
treated as an ordinary corporation. It should rather be treated like a partnership and
based on this partnership analogy, the Plaintiff claimed the remedies that would
ordinary be available to it if it was a partnership and the directors had abused their
powers. The Plaintiffs argued that it should not be deprived of those remedies merely
because they requested and obtained a corporation. 192 The Defendants on the other
192
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hand argued that the Plaintiffs’ arguments could not be sustained because they were
not authorised by the statute to act on behalf of the corporation, even if the case, like
the current one, involved a director’s abuse of power. The question to determine is who
can then bring an application.
3.1

Who may bring an application on behalf of the corporation?

In response to the Plaintiffs’ arguments about treating this corporation like a
partnership, the court stated that the corporation is a separate person from its
members and this principle of corporate personality is what the court referred to as the
Rule.
In law the corporation and the aggregate members of the corporation are
not the same thing for purposes like this; and the only question can be
whether the facts alleged in this case justify a departure from the rule which,
prima facie, would require that the corporation should sue in its own name
and in its corporate character, or in the name of someone whom the law has
appointed to be its representative.193

Therefore, the Rule referred to by the court is the principle of corporate personality,
which states that:

1. corporation should sue in its own name and in its corporate character or
2. the corporation could sue in the name of someone whom the law has appointed
to be its representative. (Section 74 of the Act of Parliament provided that the
directors or treasurer may represent the company.)
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The second aspect relates to statutory representation. Often times focus is placed on
the first point, that the corporation is the proper plaintiff but on analysing this case it is
clear that there is a second applicant. This applicant is specifically empowered by the
statute to represent the corporation.
3.1.1 Strict requirements when anyone else other than the corporation may
bring an application.
The court said that although it may seem too strict for the court to hold the corporate
character against the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff still could not sue the directors on behalf of
the corporation; this was the principle of corporate personality. But the judge provided
strict requirements that, if met, could allow the Plaintiff in this case to sue the directors
of behalf of the corporation.
Corporations like this, of a private nature, are in truth little more than
private partnerships; and in cases which may easily be suggested it would be
too much to hold that a society of private persons associated together in
undertakings... are to be deprived of their civil rights, inter se, because... the
Legislature may have conferred upon them the benefit of a corporate
character. If a case should arise of injury to a corporation by some of its
members, for which no adequate remedy remained, except that of a suit by
individual corporators in their private characters and asking in such
character the protection of those rights to which in their corporate character
they were entitled, I cannot but think that the principle so forcibly laid down
by...other cases would apply. But on the other hand, it must not be without
reasons of a very urgent character that established rules of law and practice
are to be departed from, rules which, though in a sense technical, are
founded on general principles of justice and convenience.194
The Judge said that in the future if the members of a corporation have no remedy
available to them, three elements need to be established in order for the Plaintiff to
194
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sue:(1) whether he or she has a right under the Act; (2) no remedy is available under the
Act, except to sue the incorporators; and (3) he or she must provide an urgent reason,
to justify the departure from the principle of corporate personality195, which was
created on the principles of justice and convenience. Once all these requirements have
been satisfied, a Plaintiff may bring an application against the incorporators on behalf of
the corporation. The judge proceeded to discuss one of the key aspects of the Foss v
Harbottle decision that added to the existing confusion on the principles of majority rule
and corporate personality, which is shareholder approval.
3.2

Shareholders’ Approval

One of the other characteristics of the special Act, which is common in all corporate
statutes, is that all persons are bound to comply with the provisions of the statute, to
the extent that it is applicable to the person. In this case the court was bound to the
provisions of the special Act in order to determine the rights and duties of the directors
and shareholders in this corporation. The court observed the following.
The result of these clauses [under the Act of Incorporation] is that the
directors are made the governing body, subject to the superior control of
the proprietors so assembled in general meetings and as I understand the
Act, the proprietors so assembled have the power... to originate proceedings
for any purpose within the scope of the company’s powers, as well as to
control the directors in any Acts which they may have originated. There may
possibly be some exception to this proposition but such is the general effect
of the provisions of the statute.196
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With reference to the provisions of the statute the court said that although the
directors’ act of selling the property was voidable, the corporation could choose to
confirm the conduct, meaning that the corporation could simply allow the conduct.
It is only necessary to refer to the clauses of the Act to show that, whilst the
supreme governing body, the proprietors at a special general meeting
assembled, retain the power of exercising the functions conferred upon
them by the Act of Incorporation, it cannot be competent to allow individual
corporators to sue in the manner proposed by the Plaintiff on the present
record. 197
This meant that the Plaintiff could not bring an application if the shareholders still had
the power to confirm or condone the action complained of by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff
had to ensure that the shareholders had exhausted all avenues available to them in
order to address the abuse of power. In terms of the special Act or the Act of
Incorporation, the shareholders were authorised to condone any action of the directors
through a general meeting: those were the powers of the shareholders the court
referred to.
Whilst the Court may be declaring the acts complained of to be void at the
suit of the present Plaintiffs, who in fact may be the only proprietors who
disapprove of them, the governing body of proprietors may defeat the
decree by lawfully resolving upon the confirmation of the very acts which
are the subject of the suit. The very fact that the governing body of
proprietors assembled at the special general meeting may so bind even a
reluctant minority is decisive to shew that the frame of this suit cannot be
sustained whilst that body retains its functions. In order that suit may be
sustained it must be shewn either that there is no such power as I have
supposed remaining in the proprietors or at least that all means have been
resorted to and found ineffectual to set that body in motion.198
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In this case, a general meeting had not been held which was why the court decided that
it was premature for the Plaintiff to bring the action. The court went further and said, as
the matter was before him and the meeting had not been held, he could not make an
order on the action because the option of the general meeting was still available. 199 The
judge said that it would be pointless to make an order on the conduct because the
shareholders could lawfully hold a meeting to allow the directors conduct and this
decision would be binding on all the shareholders200 and this decision would essentially
override the court’s judgment.
3.3

Fraudulent conduct

The fraudulent conduct related to how the directors had raised money for the
corporation. The directors had mortgaged the property which was in contravention of
the special Act of Parliament. Section 90 of the special Act of Parliament specifically
stated that,
after one-half of the capital of £150,000 should have been paid up, the
board of directors, with the sanction of a general meeting, empowered to
borrow at interest any sum or sums of money not exceeding £150,000 in the
whole, on the security of the lands, property and effects of the company,
by deed or writing under their common seal...201
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In relation to fraudulent conduct, the judge posed the question as to whether an
individual could bring an action on behalf of the company, on the basis of the fraudulent
conduct, despite the powers of the shareholders being in existence.202 The court held
that firstly, the shareholders at a general meeting could not confirm a fraudulent act,
meaning the minority shareholder would not be bound to any decision of the
shareholders at that meeting. Therefore in answering the question the court said that
the individual, or in this case the minority shareholder, could bring an action in the case
of fraud and the directors would be held personally liable for their fraudulent conduct.
If a transaction be void, and not merely voidable, the corporation cannot
confirm it, so as to bind a dissenting minority of its members... [I]f the object
of the suit was to rescind these [fraudulent] transactions, and the allegations
in the bill shewed that justice could not be done to the shareholders without
allowing two to sue on behalf of themselves and others, very different
considerations arise in a case like the present, in which the consequences
only of the alleged illegal Acts are sought to be visited personally upon the
directors.203
This case confirms three key elements that relate to a corporation. Firstly, the
importance of the statute is emphasised, because the powers of the directors and
shareholders are expressly stated therein. Secondly, the Rule is that only the
corporations in its corporate character and its statutory representatives may bring an
action to remedy wrongful conduct done to the corporation. Anyone else, who wanted
to bring an action on behalf of the corporation must establish three things (1) a right
under the statute, (2) there are no other remedies available to address the conduct and
202
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(3) the urgent reason to justify a departure from the Rule that only a corporation or its
statutory representative may bring an action on behalf of the corporation. Lastly, the
only time a minority shareholder may bring an application without these strict
requirements under the Act of Parliament is in the case of fraud.
The judgment of Foss v Harbottle has, over the years been modified and applied in all
sorts of cases, only to yield undesirable results.

The importance of the type of

corporation is evident here. The Foss v Harbottle case dealt with a corporation created
under an Act of Parliament, the court applied the provisions of the Act of Parliament
strictly to obtain the judgment found. A case that applied these rules to a joint stock
company was Burland v Earle, which is discussed below.
4.

The Rule in Foss v Harbottle

The case that applied the Foss v Harbottle case was Burland v Earle.204 This case is
known for the following quotation.
It is an elementary principle of the law relating to joint stock companies that
the court will not interfere with the internal management of companies
acting within their powers, and in fact has no jurisdiction to do so. Again it is
clear law that in order to redress a wrong done to the company, or to
recover moneys or damages alleged to be due to the company, the action
should prima facie be brought by the company itself. These cardinal
principles are laid down in the well-known cases of Foss v Harbottle and
Mozley v Alston.205
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In comparison to the Foss v Harbottle case, Foss v Harbottle dealt with a corporation
created under an Act of Parliament, but in Burland v Earle, the courts dealt with a
corporation created by a Letters Patent statute in Canada. Essentially, we have a case
that applied the Rule of corporations to a Letters Patent statute all while considering the
entity seeking redress as a joint stock company instead of a corporation. Let us consider
the facts and decision of this case.
4.1

Burland v Earle

A corporation was formed by a Letters Patent statute. It was called the British American
Bank Note company.206 A director in this corporation, British American Bank Note
Company (“BABNC”) named Burland bought plant and material of an insolvent company
called Burland Lithographic Company (“the property”). He sold the property to BABNC
and retained the profits. BABNC paid him from a reserve fund of BABNC. The Plaintiff’s
argued that Burland’s actions were illegal because the statute did not expressly state
that a reserve fund could be created and that Burland was acting as a trustee of BABNC
when he sold the property to BABNC. The defendant argued that BABNC was authorised
to create by-laws by the statute and the by-laws made provision the creation of a
reserve funds.
According to this statute, “a company was not bound to divide all its profits on each
occasion among its shareholders.”207 The company could legally reserve any portion of
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the profits at its own discretion, and a Court had no jurisdiction to regulate it. 208 The
statute provided that, “whether the undivided portion is retained to credit of profit or
loss or even carried to credit of reserve, it may lawfully, in the absence of an express
power, be invested on the securities selected by the directors, subject to the control of
the general meeting, [but the control should not be] restricted to such investments as
trustees are authorised to make.”209
The statute further said that, “it is not ultra vires for a company to invest in the name of
a sole trustee. He [the trustee] is strictly accountable, but the dissentient shareholders
are not entitled to an injunction against the directors and the company in respect of
such investments so long as it appears to be bona fide.”210
Court of Appeal Decision
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Chief Justice that the statute did not
expressly say that, a reserve fund could be created; therefore, it ordered the
distribution of Burland’s profits as dividends to the shareholders. Burland appealed to
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
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Decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC)
The arguments put forward by the Appellants (Burland) and the Defendants (Earle) are
discussed before the JCPC’s decision as this will assist in contextualising the Judicial
Committee’s decision.
Appellant’s Arguments.
The arguments made by the appellant were that “the Court, in the absence of fraud or
oppression had no right or duty of interference”; that the amount of money that the
Court of Appeal allowed to be distributed to the shareholders as dividends, was a
matter for the internal management of the company to decide not the Courts, “the
amount...was a question of internal management and policy to be decided by the
directors or majority shareholders acting in the legitimate exercise of their
judgment.”211
In regards to the creation of the reserve fund the appellants argued that the director,
Burland, was authorised to create a reserve fund in terms of the by-laws, subject to the
approval at a general meeting. Creation of the by-laws is a statutory power granted to
the directors of the corporation. “In the case of this company the creation of a reserve
had been its settled policy for thirty years and had never been objected to by any
shareholder...” It not clear from this argument, whether the appellant argued that the
statute need not be complied with if a company becomes accustomed to doing things a
certain way. It does not make sense; the law must be complied with.
211
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Lastly in regards to the sale of the property by Burland to BABNC, the appellants argued
that Burland was not acting as a trustee of the BABNC, “the evidence shows that he
[Burland] bought as a creditor of the insolvent company to protect himself from loss,
not with an intention of reselling to the company of which he was director.” 212
Defendant’s Arguments.
In relation to the creation of the reserve fund, the defendant argued that even though
the by-laws said that the directors could create a reserve fund, it was never created. The
amount that was used by the directors to buy the property from Burland came straight
out of the profits available to be distributed to the shareholders. 213 In regard to the bylaw that allowed the creation of the reserve fund, the defendant argued that the
particular by-law was illegal because the Letters Patent statute did not expressly state
that the directors could reserve the funds, the statute stated that “it (the company) can
legally reserve any portion thereof at its own discretion...”not the directors. With
reference to the different jurisdictions (England and Canada), the defendant argued that
although there were provisions in English statutes that allowed directors to create a
reserve fund, there were no similar provisions in the Canadian statute, and none in this
particular Letters Patent statute.214 This aspect is particularly important as the court was
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aware, through these arguments, of the significance of applying law from different
jurisdictions.
On the issue of the sale of the property from Burland to BABNC, the defendants argued
that Burland purchased the property with a view to sell it to BABNC, he should have
been deemed a trustee of BABNC because “it was his duty [as trustee] to buy [the
property] for the company [BABNC] and not for himself.”215
In light of the facts and the arguments, the court proceeded to identify the legal
principles applicable to this case.
The Legal Principles
The principles on which Lord Davey’s judgment was based are set out below. This is the
key part of the Burland v Earle judgment and the part that is often cited as the Rule in
Foss v Harbottle.

It is an elementary principle of the law relating to joint stock companies that
the court will not interfere with the internal management of companies
acting within their powers, and in fact has no jurisdiction to do so. Again it is
clear law that in order to redress a wrong done to the company, or to
recover moneys or damages alleged to be due to the company, the action
should prima facie be brought by the company itself. These cardinal
principles are laid down in the well-known cases of Foss v Harbottle and
Mozley v Alston.216

power to create a reserve fund (Reference made to the 1862 Companies Act). There is no
corresponding provision in any Act applicable to this company and accordingly the power does
not exist.”
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The two elementary principles are: (1) the court will not interfere with the internal
management of companies, and (2) the company is the only person who may bring an
application to redress a wrong done to it.217 Lord Davey provides an exception to the
second rule.
Where the person against whom the relief is sought themselves hold[s] and
control[s] the majority of the shares in the company, will not permit an
action to be brought in the name of the company. In that case the Court will
allow the shareholders complaining to bring an action in their own names. 218
In the judgment in Salomon v Salomon, the court showed that its powers are limited to
the statute; it could only apply the provisions of the statute. Therefore in this case,
Burland v Earle, the question is where does the Court obtain the power to allow the
plaintiff to bring an application or to say “[i]n that case the Court will allow the
shareholders complaining to bring an action in their own names”? The court did not
have any such power. With reference to the Salomon v Salomon case, the court should
have referred to the Letters Patent statute as the point of reference, to determine what
the statute provided regarding a shareholders rights to bring an action, if at all. The
court in Burland v Earle simply made it up without any authorisation, the court simply
created the Rule of Foss v Harbottle.
Lord Davey explained that “a plaintiff cannot complain of acts which are valid if done
with the approval of the majority of the shareholders or are capable of being confirmed
217
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by the majority.”219 The Judge in this case, takes the development of the company law a
step back to the situation where the shareholders are the company.220
Even though the rule does not allow a plaintiff to bring an action, Lord Davey provided
the types of actions a plaintiff could bring to court to be remedied because they could
be remedied by the majority.
It should be added that no mere informality or irregularity which can be
remedied by the majority will entitle the minority to sue, if the act when
done regularly would be within the powers of the company and the
intention of the majority of the shareholders is clear.221
This legal principle confirms the ambiguous situation under section 18 of 1862
Companies Act. Up until this case a company registered under 1862 Companies Act was
a legal person.222 Now, in 1902 where the intention of the majority of the shareholder
should have nothing to do with the powers of a company, they are intertwined by this
judgment and furthermore confirmed and emphasised by the language in section 11
and section 18 of the 1862 Companies Act.
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The last main principle (3) is the one decided in the case of North-West Transportation v
Beatty.223 The facts and decision are briefly as follows.
North-West Transportation Company v Beatty
James H Beatty (Beatty) owned a ship called the United Empire, which he wanted to sell
to the company, in which he was a director. The company was incorporated under a
Letters Patent statute, the Canada Joint Stock Companies Letters Patent Act of 1869. In
order to give effect to the sale Beatty acquired more than half of the shares in the
company.
Thereafter, the board of directors (empowered by the Act) passed a by-law authorizing
the purchase by the company of the said ship and a meeting of the shareholders was
subsequently called and held at which the by-law was confirmed. James Beatty holding
301 shares in the company, voted as a shareholder in the meeting to confirm the sale
and the sale was approved. One of the shareholders, Henry Beatty, who voted against
the confirmation of the by-laws at the special meeting of shareholders, brought an
application to have the sale of the ship set aside.
The trial court held that Beatty’s actions resulted in a conflict of interest due to his
three-fold character as a shareholder, a director and a vendor. However, the Judicial
Committee held that in terms of the letters patent statute the director, Mr. Beatty was
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entitled to purchase more shares and to vote on those shares, “he had a perfect right to
acquire further shares.”224 The court further held that:
The acquisition of the United Empire was a pure question of policy, as to
which it might be expected that there would be differences of opinion, and
upon which the voice of the majority ought to prevail; to reject the votes of
the defendant upon the question of the adoption of the bye-law would be to
give effect to the views of the minority and to disregard the majority. 225

Lord Davey in the Burland v Earle case drew the following from the judgment in NorthWest Transportation v Beatty: “a shareholder is not debarred from voting or using his
voting power to carry a resolution by the circumstance of his having a particular interest
in the subject matter of the vote.”226 This was the last legal principle identified by Lord
Davey.
In summary, the legal principles applied by the Burland v Earle case suggest that the
company does not have any corporate personality despite the Salomon v Salomon case,
secondly, the majority shareholders are the company and this is emphasised by the
1862 Companies Act.
These principles mentioned above were applied to the facts of the Burland v Earle case
by the Judicial Committee. Judicial Committee’s decision is discussed below.
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The JCPC Decision in Burland v Earle
The JCPC decision was based on the legal principles identified by Lord Davey. The
Judicial Committee incorrectly referred to the litigants in the case as “alike shareholders
in a joint stock company called British American Bank Note Company.”227 The Judicial
Committee then proceeded to the issue of the sale of the property to BABNC, and said
that Burland was liable on the amounts he received as a profit, but on the issue of
Burland being a trustee, the Judicial Committee said that “[t]here is no evidence
whatever of any commission or mandate to Burland to purchase on behalf of the
company, or that he was in any sense a trustee for the company of the purchased
property. It may be that he had an intention in his own mind to resell it to the company
but it was an intention which he was at liberty to carry out or abandon at his own
will.”228 On the reasons and principles set out above the Judicial Committee decided in
favour to the defendants.
What the decision of Burland v Earle did to the development of the English company law
was to undo the work done or the progress made by the decision in Salomon v Salomon
regarding corporations created by a contractarian statute. The legal principles identified
by Burland v Earle became known as the Rule of Foss v Harbottle, despite its incorrect
application of the actual Foss v Harbottle case. The Rule of Foss v Harbottle was also
adopted by the South African company law. An analysis of the Rule of Foss v Harbottle
will now be provided.
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4.2

Analysis of the Rule in Foss v Harbottle

In an article published in the Cambridge Law Review, written by K.W. Wedderburn229,
“Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle,”230 Wedderburn says there are
two sources of the Rule of Foss v Harbottle. As mentioned above the Rule in Foss v
Harbottle, is drawn from the Burland v Earle case.
It is an elementary principle of the law relating to joint stock companies that
the court will not interfere with the internal management of companies
acting within their powers, and in fact has no jurisdiction to do so. Again it is
clear law that in order to redress a wrong done to the company, or to
recover moneys or damages alleged to be due to the company, the action
should prima facie be brought by the company itself. These cardinal
principles are laid down in the well-known cases of Foss v Harbottle and
Mozley v Alston.231

Wedderburn explains that the two sources of this Rule in Foss v Harbottle, are the
corporation principle and the partnership principle. The first principle is that the
corporation is the only person who may bring an application to remedy wrong done to
it.
“[T]his springs naturally from the treatment in the law of corporation as a
‘person’ separate from the members of which it is composed... Thus, injuries
allegedly caused to the corporation, not only by outsiders, but also its own
directors where their duties are owed to the corporation alone and not its
members, must be remedied not by the members but by corporate action.
That was the decision of in Foss v Harbottle itself.”232
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Regarding the second principle, which springs from the partnership doctrine,
Weddernburn says,
In the early 19th century, courts of equity were averse to interfering at all
between one partner and another, unless it was for the purpose of
dissolving the partnership, it being no duty of the court to settle all
partnerships squabbles. [This] approach was taken over by the judges in
dealing with the internal affairs of the trading companies which were, after
1844, incorporated. Once established, the principle was applied rigorously to
the many ‘irregularities’ committed by those managing joint stock
companies.
As mentioned above regarding the deed of settlement, the origin of the joint stock
companies stemmed from partnerships under those deeds of settlements. By virtue of
this deed, courts of equity would not interfere in partnership business because their
relationship grew out of equitable principles as opposed to individuals enforcing rights
under a statute.233 Individuals within a company could not complain of various
irregularities, such as unfairly made calls by a director or an irregular quorum at a
director’s meeting because, these matters were of internal management and under the
control of the majority. According to Wedderburn, this is the unsatisfactory origin of
Lord Davey’s proposition to the effect that the court has no jurisdiction in matters of
“internal management”.234
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The principle of majority rule was already known as a fundamental principle of
corporations. Courts however used the principle to justify the non-interference which
was borrowed from the partnership principle. Therefore, “whatever the ordinary
majority of members could ratify was a matter outside the purview of the court. Internal
affairs were for the majority to decide.”235
The majority decided matters of internal management and also decided whether action
could be taken in a particular instance. If there was an irregularity that the minority
wanted to take to court, it was up to the majority to decide whether to litigate or not.236
Therefore in summary:
1. if they (the majority) decided to litigate the corporation was the plaintiff – the
corporation principle (the individual would get some recourse through the
corporation)
2. if they ratified237 the irregularity and therefore did not proceed to litigate, there
was no recourse for the individual, and he or she could not act in his or her
personal capacity on behalf of the corporation.
3. if there was no ratification and no litigation, there was still no recourse for the
individual because
i.

he or she could not act in his or her personal capacity,
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ii.

he or she had no standing because the company was the proper plaintiff,
and lastly,

iii.

regardless of (i) and (ii),

courts could not interfere because of the

partnership principle238 and matters of internal management were for
the majority to deal with not the court.
It is clear that there was no real remedy available. The only hope for the individual was
to determine if he or she could fall under one of the exceptions to the Rule in Foss v
Harbottle. According to Wedderburn, the exceptions are not real exceptions, except for
one. These exceptions suggest that the individual can obtain redress in the following
circumstances.
1. The action is ultra vires- the Rule does not apply here, because the majority
cannot ratify an ultra vires or illegal rule, it is contrary to the Act.239
2. Special majorities- If the director had committed an irregularity by not obtaining
a special resolution where one was required under the memorandum and
articles of association, the director would assert that he or she would take the
corporation to court, and because the majority would not want to go through
litigation only to be told to ratify the conduct, the directors simply an obtained
ordinary resolution on an action the initially required a special resolution. This
became known as an exception to Rule. However, the statute amended the
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procedure of obtaining shareholder approval for particular transactions, thereby
eliminating this exception to the Rule.
3. The individual has a personal action- in this instance the Rule does not apply
because here the individual’s personal action stems either from the articles or
statutorily and has nothing to do with acting on behalf of the Company.240
4. There is fraud- this is the only instance in which the Rule has an exception.241
This exception was recognised as early as the Rule itself, “it will already be
apparent that it constitutes a relaxation not so much of the ‘internal
interference’ prohibition, as of the rule demanding that actions brought to
remedy wrongs done to the company should be brought in the name of the
company itself, i.e. under the authority of the majority.”242

Conclusion
The lack of clarity within the statute has been a confusing and unfortunate application
of principles of corporate personality and majority rule in cases involving corporations
created by a contractarian statute. The Salomon v Salomon case clarified the position for
some time, by directing one to the statute as the first point of reference, through which
the company was created. However, once the Burland v Earle case was decided, the
ambiguity had returned and this time with reinforcements under section 11 and section
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18 of the 1862 Companies Act. The judgment of Burland v Earle simply contributed to
the lack of clarity and confusing concept that the decision of majority of the
shareholders is the decision of the company. Burland v Earle misapplied the Foss v
Harbottle case to create what is known as the Rule in Foss v Harbottle which in fact has
nothing to do with the actual case of Foss v Harbottle. Burland v Earle incorrectly
applied the Foss v Harbottle case. The facts of the Foss v Harbottle case relate to a
corporation created by a special Act of Parliament and yet the Judge in Burland v Earle
saw it fit to apply that case to the facts in Burland v Earle which relate to a corporation
created by a Letters Patent statute. Furthermore, Burland v Earle emphasised the
Predicament. The Predicament is created where the statute is not sought as the point of
reference when considering any aspect relating to a corporation and more so, when
considering the rights and duties of the shareholder and each director in the
corporation.
Foss v Harbottle involved a corporation created under a special Act of Parliament. The
court applied the principles of corporate personality clearly and strictly, in accordance
with the Act of Parliament. This shows that when dealing with corporations, the statute
must be complied with strictly, as that is where it derives its power of existence.
Similarly, Salomon v Salomon applied the law strictly but in a case involving a
corporation created by a contractarian statute. These two cases have simply provided
the solution to the Predicament which is to seek clarity of the statute. Today, this
statutory clarity may be found in adopting a division of powers statute. The clarity of the
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statute will ensure that the principles of corporate personality and majority rule are
developed properly.
South Africa has followed in the footsteps of Burland v Earle due to the influence of
English company law. However, since May 2011, South Africa has adopted a new
Companies Act and with it a new perspective for the development of South African
company law, a perspective based on transparency and accountability.
The 2008 SA Companies Act is not clear on the duties of the individuals. If transparency
and accountability, inter alia, are the goals of the 2008 SA Companies Act then clarity
needs to obtained. This clarity of the statute is obtained by adopting of a division of
powers model statute; a statute that divides the powers of the individuals in a company.
Further discussion on ascertaining the clarity of the statute is provided in Chapter 5.
In chapter 5, I recommend specific amendments to the 2008 SA Companies Act, in light
of the importance of the clarity in the statute. The recommendations are aimed at
enabling South Africa to take full advantage of the oppression remedy under section 163
of the 2008 SA Companies Act. The oppression remedy was created in order to provide
relief for oppression or unfair prejudice which arose as consequence of the strict
compliance with the statute or as a consequence of each individual exercising his or her
duty as provided in the statute. This is why it is crucial that the statute state the rights
and duties of the individual clearly, so that the only point of reference is the statute.
Let us now consider the particular provisions of the oppression remedy under the
section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act and section 241 of the CBCA.
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Chapter 4: The Oppression Remedy
Introduction
The oppression remedy in Canada is often described as the widest corporate law
remedy in the world. The oppression remedy “seeks to enforce fairness and equity, and
is not limited to the enforcement of lawful conduct. The potential protection it offers
corporate stakeholders is awesome”.243 This was the description of the oppression
remedy under section 241 of the CBCA: it is hoped that section 163 of the 2008 SA
Companies Act is considered as awesome as section 241 of the CBCA when compared to
its predecessors. Now that South Africa has adopted this wide remedy the courts have
an opportunity to provide even better shareholder remedies than in previous years.
However, clarity in the interpretation of the principles of majority rule and corporate
personality are key elements to providing the best possible shareholder remedy. Once
this clarity is obtained through a clearer division of powers statute, South Africa can take
full advantage of the vast number of cases on the oppression remedy in Canada.
This chapter aims to provide a comparison of the provision under section 241 of the
CBCA and section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act, in order to determine the scope of
this remedy. This chapter is separated into three parts. Part 1 discusses the provisions
of section 241 (1) and (2) as well as section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act. The
oppression remedy provisions in both jurisdictions fall in to the following categories:
243
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standing under the oppression remedy (this relates to who has standing to bring an
application to the court), the scope of the conduct, standard of corporate conduct,
whose interests are being protected and what interests are being protected in the
context of the reasonable expectations of shareholders. Thereafter, Part 2 provides a
discussion of the wide judicial powers to provide shareholder relief. Lastly, Part 3
addresses whether the oppression remedy may be invoked by to public corporations
and majority shareholders.

PART I: Interpretation
The table below shows the comparison between the provisions of section 241 (1) and
(2) of the CBCA with those of section 163(1) of the 2008 SA Companies Act. These
particular sections provide the statutory elements that an applicant or complainant
must identify to bring an application for the oppression remedy and they include: the
conduct, the standard of conduct and standing. The parts that are highlighted below
represent the similarities and other parts are the differences.
CBCA section 241 (1) &(2)

2008 SA Companies Act section 163 (1)

(1) A complainant may apply to a court for an (1) A shareholder or a director of a company
order under this section.
may apply to a court for relief if—
(2) If, on an application under subsection (1),
the court is satisfied that in respect of a (a)
any act or omission of the company, or a
corporation or any of its affiliates
related person, has had a result that is
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that
(a)
any act or omission of the corporation or any unfairly disregards the interests of, the
applicant;
of its affiliates effects a result,
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(b)
the business or affairs of the corporation or
any of its affiliates are or have been carried on
or conducted in a manner, or

(b)
the business of the company, or a related
person, is being or has been carried on or
conducted in a manner that is oppressive or
unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly
disregards the interests of, the applicant; or

(c)
the powers of the directors of the corporation (c)
the powers of a director or prescribed officer
or any of its affiliates are or have been
of the company, or a person related to the
exercised in a manner that is oppressive or company, are being or have been exercised in
unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly a manner that is oppressive or unfairly
disregards the interests of any security holder, prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the
creditor, director or officer, the court may interests of, the applicant.
make an order to rectify the matters
complained of.
Table A: Provisions of section 241(1) and (2) of the CBCA and section 163(1) of the 2008 SA
Companies Act compared

1.

Standing

This category deals with who may bring and application to court. The term used in
Canada is “complainant” and in South Africa is “applicant”. The CBCA has much wider
standing provision than South Africa. In terms of section 163 of 2008 SA Companies Act,
the applicant is a shareholder or a director. These applicants are described as follows
under section 1 of the 2008 SA Companies Act,




“shareholder”- subject to section 57(1) means the holder of a share issued by a
company and who is entered as such in the certificated or uncertificated244
securities register as the case may be,
“director” – means a member of the board of a company contemplated in
section 66 or an alternative director of a company and includes any person
occupying the position of a director or alternative director by whatever name
designated.

Under section 238 of the CBCA the complainant is defined as:
244
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“complainant” means
(a) a registered holder or beneficial owner, and a former registered holder or
beneficial owner, of a security of a corporation or any of its affiliates,
(b) a director245 or an officer or a former director or officer of a corporation or
any of its affiliates,
(c) the Director246, or
(d) any other person who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person to make
an application under this Part.
A brief description of each complainant is provided hereunder.
1.1

Security holder

In the CBCA, security is defined under section 2(1) as follows, “security” means a
share of any class or series of shares or a debt obligation of a corporation and
includes a certificate evidencing such a share or debt obligation.
1.2

Director and director




“director” means a person occupying the position of director by whatever
name called and “directors” and “board of directors” includes a single
director and
“Director” means the Director appointed under section 260 (which
relates to the Minister’s election to appoint a director to carry out the
duties and exercise the powers of the Director under this Act)

In 1970, the Dickerson Committee was mandated to create a new Federal corporate
statute. While creating the draft statute they considered who the complainant might be.
They said the broadest definition should be provided to include the persons who clearly
might be interested. They also added section 238 (d) which leaves the task of

245

CBCA, supra note at Section 2(1) “director” means a person occupying the position of director
by whatever name called and “directors” and “board of directors” includes a single director;
246

CBCA, supra note at Section 2(1) “Director” means the Director appointed under section 260;

97

determining whether a person that brought an application is a proper person to the
court. Section 238 (d) provides that “any person the court thinks is a proper person to
participate in the litigation.”
The Dickerson Committee even considered including legal representatives of a
deceased’s estate, as it was recommended by the Jenkins Report, but later decided
against it due to the fact that the court could use its discretion to determine who was a
proper person to make an application.
South Africa may consider an expansion of the “applicant” under the oppression remedy
considering the nature of the remedy. I suggest that the South African legislature insert
an equivalent to section 238(d) into the section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act. The
inclusion would mean that no one is expressly excluded by the Act and that anyone’s
“exclusion” would take the form of dismissal by the court, which would have the power
to determine a proper person.
2.

The Scope of the Conduct

This category addresses where the oppression remedy may be applied, what conduct to
look for. In terms of section 241 of the CBCA and section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies
Act, the conduct complained of relates to (1) an act or omission of a related or affiliated
person, (2) the business (South Africa) or business and affairs (Canada) of the company
and (3) the powers of the Directors (Canada) or director or prescribed officer (South
Africa).
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2.1

“Affiliate” or “Related Person”

CBCA

2008 SA Companies Act

any act or omission of the corporation or any any act or omission of the company, or a
of its affiliates effects a result,
related person, has had a result that is
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that
unfairly disregards the interests of, the
applicant;
Table B: section 241 (2) (a) of the CBCA and section 163 (1) (a) of the 2008 SA Companies Act.

Under the CBCA, “affiliate” means an affiliated body corporate within the meaning of
section 1 (2). For the purposes of this Act,
(a) one body corporate is affiliated with another body corporate if one of them is
the subsidiary of the other or both are subsidiaries of the same body corporate
or each of them is controlled by the same person; and
(b) if two bodies corporate are affiliated with the same body corporate at the
same time, they are deemed to be affiliated with each other.
Under the 2008 SA Companies Act, a related person is defined with reference to section
2 which states247, a juristic person is related to another juristic person if—
i.
ii.
iii.

either of them directly or indirectly controls the other, or the business of the
other, as determined in accordance with subsection (2);
either is a subsidiary of the other; or
a person directly or indirectly controls each of them, or the business of each of
them, as determined in accordance with subsection (2).

This oppression remedy has substantially widened the scope of the shareholder remedy
compared to section 252 of the 1973 SA Companies Act.248 Under the 2008 SA
Companies Act, an applicant can claim for oppression by a related person.

247

Refer to 2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 15 at section 2 “Related and inter-related
persons and control” for the complete section.
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2.2

“Act” or “Omission”

According to the Dickerson Report, the oppression remedy includes isolated acts as well
as a continuing course of oppressive conduct.249 It is easier to prove an act than a lack of
action. When proving the lack of action focus instead on the effect of the result of a
person not doing something or not having done something.250
2.3

“Business” or “Business and Affairs”

The South African section does not contain the word “affairs”. In Canada, “affairs” are
described as the non-business activities of the corporation and includes the internal
management of the corporation; these are matters that go beyond the day-to-day
business activities of the corporation. Therefore the oppression remedy may be sought
in the event of irregularities regarding internal management of the corporation.251 As
mentioned, section 163 of 2008 SA Companies Act only provides for the “business”
carried on. In section 66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act, the Legislature provides that the
directors’ duties include “business” and “affairs” of the corporation. For the sake of
consistency I suggest that the South African Legislature add the word “affairs” to section
163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act in order that the provision is complete and in order
to eliminate issues of trying to distinguish whether one’s conduct really falls under
248

Refer to Appendix A below for the provision under section 252 (1) of the 1973 SA Companies
Act
249

Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 163.

250

Corporate Law in Canada, supra note 37 at 538.
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Corporate Law in Canada, supra note 37 at 540 citing CBCA, supra note 16 at section 2 (1)
“affairs” means the relationships among a corporation, its affiliates and the shareholders,
directors and officers of such bodies corporate but does not include the business carried on by
such bodies corporate;
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“affairs” or just “business”. This would be an unnecessary limitation on the South
African oppression remedy. Now let us consider the Powers of Directors under the
oppression remedy.
2.4

“Powers of the Director or Prescribed Officer”

Section 66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act expressly provides the power of the board of
directors. This is a significant change from the delegated powers of the shareholders in
the 1973 SA Companies Act. It is a significant development as the problems arising from
the delegation of powers to directors will no longer applicable. In addition, the South
African oppression remedy also includes the conduct of the prescribed officer, whose
powers are provided under Regulation 38 of the 2008 SA Companies Act.
Canada also has a similar provisions relating to the powers of the directors which is
provided under section 102 of the CBCA. “As most of the corporate activity is
undertaken at the behest of the Board of Directors, the exercise of the directors’ powers
is often the source of the oppression remedy”.252 In light of this quotation and section
66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act, it makes more sense to clarify the scope of conduct
which provides for the “business of the company…”, that the Legislature also include
“affairs” in section 163 (1) (c) of the 2008 SA Companies Act .
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Dennis H Peterson, Shareholders Remedies in Canada, loose- leaf (consulted on 21 May
2009), (Toronto: Butterworths Canada, 1960) at 17-21 at para 17.38.
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2.5

Threatened Oppressive Conduct

Threatened conduct is not included in the CBCA, however two provincial statutes have
included this conduct, namely, Ontario and British Columbia.253 An Ontario court held
that the apprehension of future oppression might be dealt with if it was clear on a
balance of probabilities that such oppression would take place. 254 In comparison, South
Africa does not include this type of conduct under the section 163 of the 2008 SA
Companies Act.
3.

Standard of Conduct

The standards of conduct under both oppression remedies, Canada’s section 241 and
South Africa’s section 163, are oppressive conduct, unfairly prejudicial conduct and
unfairly disregarding conduct. When drafting the oppression remedy provision the
Dickerson Committee said that the changes to section 210 of the 1948 UK Companies
Act would include the following under the proposed CBCA.
To the basic criterion [of] “oppressive” is added the phrase “unfairly
prejudicial to or in disregard of the interest of”, which makes abundantly
clear that the section applies where the impugned conduct is wrongful, even
if it is not actually unlawful.255
The intention of the oppression remedy was to broaden the remedy to an extent never
provided under section 210 of the 1948 UK Companies Act. Bear in mind that these

253

Refer to Chapter 5 for the oppression remedy provisions under the various Canadian
provincial corporate statutes.
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255

820099 Ontario Inc. v Harold E. Ballard Ltd (1991), 3 BLR (2d) 113 at 123.
Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 163 para 485.
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standards go hand in hand with the reasonable expectations of the shareholder,
discussed below.
3.1

“Oppressive” conduct

This standard describes conduct that is coercive and abusive. Courts have described it as
conduct that is burdensome, harsh and wrongful, a visible departure from the standards
of fair dealing and an abuse of power which results in an impairment of confidence in
the probity with which the company’s affairs are being conducted.256
Bad faith is not a necessary element of the standard; the act can be abusive or harsh
without the element of bad faith from the person inflicting the abuse. 257 Over the years
oppressive conduct in Canada has included “failure on the part of the corporation and
its controlling shareholders to take reasonable steps to simulate an arm's-length
transaction; lack of good faith on the part of the directors of the corporation;
discrimination among shareholders with the effect of benefiting the majority
shareholders to the exclusion of the minority shareholders; lack of adequate and
appropriate disclosure of material information to minority shareholders; and a plan to
eliminate a minority shareholder.”258
From the South African perspective, it may seem as though this is the return of the term
“oppressive conduct” to the South African shareholder’s remedy. Section 252 of the
256

Scottish Co-Operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1958] 3 All E.R. 66.
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Oppression and other Related Remedies, supra note 132 at 81 citing Brant Investments
Limited v KeepRite Inc, [1991] 3 OR (3d) 289 at 305-306.
258

Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Poonam Puri, “The Canadian Oppression Remedy Judicially
Considered: 1995- 2001” (2004) 30 Queen’s LJ 79 at 89.
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1973 SA Companies Act had developed from the oppressive conduct259, to the “unfair
prejudice” requirement needed to make an application under section 252 of the 1973
SA Companies Act. Under section 111bis the 1926 Union Companies Act the “oppressive
conduct”, involved no more than a lack of probity or fair dealing, or a visible departure
from the standards of fair dealing, or a violation of the conditions of fair play on which
every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely.”260 This is
fundamentally different from “oppression” under the CBCA. In the CBCA the description
of oppression “...involving more than a lack of probity or fair dealing...” is used in the
context of the oppression remedy as whole. In the Dickerson Report, the Dickerson
Committee created a whole oppression remedy not merely a provision for oppressive
conduct to address that particular conduct but a wider scope of the remedy. Now that
South Africa has adopted this CBCA oppression remedy, it is only fair that the widest
possible interpretation of the oppression remedy is provided to the shareholders
instead of unnecessarily limiting the effect of the oppression remedy by looking back at
an inadequate statutory shareholder remedy merely because the terms are similar or
identical.

259

In section 111 bis of the 1926 Union Companies Act.
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Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd v Anglo Transvaal Collieries, [1979] 3 S Afr L 713 (Wit Local
Div) at 720 with reference to Elder v Elder and Watson Ltd [1952] SC 49 at 55; Aspek Pipe Co
(Pty) Ltd and Another v Mauerberger and Others 1968 (1) SA 517 (Cape Prov Div) at 527.
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3.2

“Unfairly Prejudicial” conduct

Conduct that may fall short of “oppression” may still amount to unfairly prejudicial
conduct. The conduct described may be prejudicial but not unfair.261 “The normal
operations of a corporation must maintain a balance between the interests of corporate
stakeholders262, which necessarily means some unequal accommodation.”263 Examples
of unfairly prejudicial conduct include but are not limited to the following: failing to
disclose related party transactions, changing the corporate structure to drastically alter
debt ratios, paying dividends without formal declaration and breach of equitable
rights.264
3.3

Conduct that “unfairly disregards the interests of...”

This criterion is viewed as the least stringent of the three statutory categories. Similar to
unfairly prejudicial conduct, the interest may be disregarded but not unfairly. For
example “a corporation may require additional capital that the shareholders cannot
provide. Recapitalisation may dilute their interests or subject their returns to prior
claims, but the continued viability of the corporation is ensured.”265
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Oppression Remedy and Related Remedies, supra note 132 at 81.
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Similar to the words “company” and “corporation” the words “stakeholder” and
“shareholder” differ as well. In this thesis, I equate stakeholder with shareholder.
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Dennis H Peterson, Shareholders Remedies in Canada, loose- leaf (consulted on 21 May
2009), (Toronto: Butterworths Canada, 1960) at 17-35 para 17.69.
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4.

Whose interests are being protected under the oppression remedy?

According to the Dickerson Report, the oppression remedy was made applicable to all
cases of conduct that are “oppressive” or “unfairly prejudicial” or “unfairly disregards
the interests of” any security holder, creditor, director or officer and not just to the
narrow case where a shareholder is oppressed in his or her capacity as a shareholder.266
South Africa has limited its oppression remedy to the interests of shareholders and
directors. As discussed in chapter 3, addressing the Predicament is about the clarity of
the statute, the duties of each individual set out clearly in the statute and the strict
application of the statute. With this in mind, the court in applying the statute will be
able to clearly identify the powers of each director and shareholder, so the applicant
need not be limited to applying for the oppression remedy in his or her capacity as a
shareholder or director as identified in section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act.
The clarity of the statute will allow a director to claim is his or her capacity as a
shareholder or allow a shareholder to claim in his or her capacity as a director therefore,
I suggest this wide interpretation should be adopted by South Africa, it would emphasise
the development South Africa has made through the introduction of its section 163
oppression remedy.
5.

What interests being protected? Reasonable Expectations

The reasonable expectations of shareholders have come to be known as the
cornerstone of the Canadian oppression remedy. The advantage of seeking the
266

Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 163.

106

reasonable expectations first as opposed the standard of conduct, is that in the search
for the reasonable expectation through the various facts also helps to identify the
“oppressive”, “unfair prejudicial” and “unfairly disregarding conduct”. This is not to say
that by addressing the reasonable expectation one ignores the standards of conduct:
they, in fact, go hand in hand. The principle was identified in the often cited case of
Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd & Others.267

This case involved a company

registered under the 1948 UK Companies Act, but the case has been adopted by Canada
in the case of Krynen v Bug, which I discuss below.
5.1

Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd & Others

The company was a private company which carried on a business. It was formed to take
over a business founded by Mr Nazar. Since 1945, the business was carried on by Mr.
Nazar and Mr. Ebrahimi as partners, equally sharing the management and the profits.
Soon after the company was formed, Mr G Nazar (Mr Nazar’s son) was made a director
and a shareholder. The Nazars then had a majority of the votes in a general meeting.
Until the dispute arose, all three were directors of the company. In 1969, an ordinary
resolution was passed by the company in general meeting removing Mr. Ebrahimi from
the office of director, a resolution which was effective in law by virtue of section 184 of
the 1948 UK Companies Act and article 96 of Part 1 of Table A of the company’s Articles
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Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd & Others [1973] AC 360 [Ebrahimi].
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of Association. The application was based on section 210 of 1948 UK Companies Act and
the relief sought was an order that the Nazars purchase Mr.Ebrahimi’s shares.268
This case dealt with an application to wind up a company; within the winding up
provision, there was a requirement that the wind-up must be just and equitable.269 In
light of the discussion in chapter 1 regarding the “company”, this court discussed the
nature of a company as a legal person and its relationship to the partnership aspects of
its origin. Despite the term being used by many cases, it did not negate the nature of a
company, which is a separate person. The court confirmed the confusion that was
created due to the manner in which the company developed but that did not mean one
was dealing with a partnership, even though the equitable clause were drawn from the
partnership rule.
To refer, as many of the cases do, to “quasi-partnership” or “in substance
partnerships” may be convenient but may be confusing... A company,
however, small is a company not a partnership or even a quasi-partnership
and it is through the just and equitable clause that obligations, common to
partnership relations may come in. 270

268

The judge found that the complaint did not amount to such course of oppressive conduct to
justify an order under section 210. However he made an order for winding up of the company
under the “just and equitable” provision. The decision was appealed by the respondents
(Nazars) and set aside by the Court of Appeal, the appellants sought to have the decision of the
court restored.
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As mentioned in Chapter 2 regarding section 210 of 1948 UK Companies Act- the remedy was
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The case provided a clear context from which a remedy could be developed. In regards
to reasonable expectations, the often cited part of the case is quoted below. From this
judgment the court seems fully aware of the Predicament and therefore seeks to
provide clarity regarding the nature of a company registered under a contractarian
statute. The court made the following comments.
The words “just and equitable” are a recognition of the fact that a limited
company is more than a mere judicial entity, with a personality in law of its
own: that there is room in company law for recognition of the fact that
behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, expectations and
obligations inter se which are not necessarily submerged in the company
structure… It does, as equity always does, enable the court to subject the
exercise of legal rights to equitable considerations; considerations, that is, of
a personal character arising between one individual and another, which may
make it unjust, or inequitable, to insist on legal rights, or to exercise them in
a particular way. 271
The court acknowledged the legal rights that are available to the parties but the remedy
discussed actually came from subjecting these legal rights to equitable considerations
because to apply the legal right as they are would be unjust and inequitable. In Canada’s
case, the corporate law mainly developed from a Letters Patent statute where the legal
rights were identified in the statute expressly. To simply apply the statutory legal rights
when seeking a remedy would be unjust, which is why the inclusion of the oppression
remedy was required. The oppression remedy was created to limit the harsh
consequences of applying the legal rights. Identifying this distinction in a contractarian
statute was difficult because of the statute-based contract, which courts already
assumed had that the equitable right therein due to the company’s origin. That is why
271
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the Ebrahimi case is crucial; the case emphasized that the company is a legal person
thereby subjecting its legal right to the equitable considerations and ultimately
providing an adequate remedy.
The court proceeded to identify what these equitable considerations were and said that
the list provided is non-exhaustive. In the application of the Ebrahimi case to the CBCA
oppression remedy, Canadian courts have established that in ascertaining the
reasonable expectations in a particular case, the court considers the following: the
evidence of the history and relationship between the parties including public
announcements, provisions of agreements including the shareholders agreement and
other types of promises.272 The court will look objectively at the facts of the case and
will not accept a “wish list” in considering whether there has been oppressive, unfairly
prejudicial or unfairly disregarding conduct.273
Due to the kind of information sought to establish reasonable expectations, it is no
wonder that there are numerous cases in Canada. Every case is different, so much so
that oppression in one may not necessarily mean oppression in another. The broad
statutory language is the source of one of the most rapidly expanding areas of modern
Canadian corporate litigation, and this growth stems from the strict nature of the
statute.274 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the division of powers model in the CBCA was
adopted by most of the provinces although with a few differences. Most of the cases
272
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discussed under the Oppression Remedy come from the province of Ontario.275 The only
difference between section 241 of the CBCA and section 248 of the Ontario Business
Corporations Act276 is the addition of the remedy’s application to a threat of oppression
under section 248. The cases identified below were decided by Ontario courts. The
nature of the wide scope of the Canadian oppression remedy and the emphasis on the
particular facts of each case, leads to an array of varied decision under the section.
Therefore, in order to provide the principles of the oppression remedy in context of the
Canadian corporate law, the recent case of Krynen v Bugg, which clearly identifies and
summarises these fundamental aspects, is chosen for this purpose and is discussed
below.
5.2.1

Krynen v Bugg277

Krynen was fired on 23 September 2000. He applied for a declaration that the other
shareholders of Duracap International, Bugg and Simms, acted oppressively, unfairly,
and prejudicially toward him. Krynen established Duracap in 1993. He contacted Bugg
and Simms to provide venture capital and other support. The original idea was that
Krynen would be the president, with a controlling interest in Duracap.
He was made president, but held half the shares, while Simms and Bugg held a quarter
each. Simms and Bugg considered that the president title was merely ceremonial, and
that each of the shareholders had equal managerial responsibility. Although the
275

Ontario courts apply both the CBCA oppression remedy as well as its own section 248 of the
OBCA.
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corporation was successful, the different views of management and particularly
Krynen's habit of micro-managing according to his whim, caused conflict and morale
problems. When Krynen refused to take six-months paid leave so that the problems
could be addressed, the board passed a resolution forcing the issue and taking away his
main responsibility as marketing manager. In return, Duracap gave him a severance
package, and he continued to sit as a director, shareholder, and president, although he
was no longer a Duracap employee. Krynen argued that the resolution was the
culminating incident in a series of oppressive actions. After his removal, Duracap's
fortunes steadily improved.
The Court dismissed the application on the grounds that there was no evidence that
Simms and Bugg embarked on an improper plan to exclude or oust Krynen from
management. They acted honestly and in good faith, in the best interests of Duracap.
Krynen's expectations were unreasonable in that he envisioned that he would be able to
run the corporation his way as chief executive and have it provide him life-long
employment.
According to the court, “a useful starting point for the oppression remedy and its
ramifications may be found in Professor Welling's landmark treatise, Corporate Law in
Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) where he says this about the purpose
and philosophy behind the oppression principle and remedy”:278
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Thwarted shareholder expectation is what the oppression remedy is all
about. Each shareholder buys shares with certain expectations. Some of
these are outlandish. But some of them, particularly in a small
corporation with few shareholders, are quite reasonable expectations in
the circumstances. It is not unusual for three or four individuals to go into
business together with shared expectations of mutual profits, to use a
corporate form as a convenient organizing vehicle, and to have a
subsequent falling out. Individuals in such a situation are like the parties
to a decaying marriage relationship: they cannot be expected to operate
by friendly compromise in search of mutually satisfactory or "fair"
settlements of the many routine disagreements that can arise. The
corporate vehicle that was once a convenience now becomes a prison
with rigid rules for bars, a frame of reference for bad-tempered dispute
settlement. The rules in a corporate constitution, like all legalistic rules,
can become practical tools for dictatorship of the majority and oppression
of the minority.
When this occurs, some measure of disinterested judicial activism can
be useful. As the situation will usually (though not always) arise in
smaller corporations one assumes that the oppression remedy was
essentially designed for these corporations, where legitimate
shareholder expectations are highly likely to exist, are unlikely to be set
out on paper, yet are, because of the parties involved, susceptible of
objective proof in the usual legal manner. This, I suggest, is the place for
the oppression remedy”.279
In light of the resemblance between the Canadian oppression remedy and the South
African oppression remedy, this is a philosophy South Africa courts as well as legal
counsels should adopt. This philosophy encompasses the essence and purpose of the
oppression remedy. The court in Krynen v Bugg then provided a summary of the leading
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principles and guiding rules which have come out of the Canadian cases, a few of which
are included below.280
1. The overriding lodestar principle of oppression law is that, when determining
whether there has been oppression of a shareholder, the court must determine
what the reasonable expectations of that person were according to the
arrangements which existed between the principals. The cases on this issue have
been helpfully collected and reviewed by Farley J. in 820099 Ontario Inc. v.
Harold E. Ballard Ltd281 where he said this at pp. 185-86:
Shareholder interests would appear to be intertwined with shareholder
expectations. It does not appear to me that the shareholder
expectations which are to be considered are those that a shareholder
has as his own individual "wish list". They must be expectations which
could be said to have been (or ought to have been considered as) part
of the compact of the shareholders.
2. The term oppression suggests an inequality of bargaining power while
unfairness suggests an obligation to act equitably and impartially in the
exercise of power and authority.282
3. The terms, "unfair prejudice to" and "unfair disregard of the interests of"
require less rigorous tests than oppression. Where on the totality of the
evidence the actions and conduct complained of go beyond mere
inconvenience and lack of information, and the interests of the
complainant have been unfairly disregarded, the complainant will be
entitled to a remedy.283
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4. There is no requirement that bad faith must be shown before an order to
rectify a complaint may be made in an oppression case.284
5. Where expectations are apparently reasonable on their face but where
there is a contract dealing with these expectations, the reasonableness of
these expectations cannot prevail over the contract.
6. Reasonable expectations are not necessarily "static" or frozen expectations
and may evolve or change as the principals adapt their arrangements from
time to time.285
It is clear that the oppression remedy has a wide scope as it deals with the reasonable
expectations of shareholders. South Africa has the opportunity to enable its
shareholders to obtain a wide range of remedies by focusing on the reasonable
expectation of shareholders. South Africa can seek guidance from Canadian corporate
law in the development of its shareholder remedy. It should be noted, however, that the
scope of the oppression remedy is dependent on the clarity of its statute. Therefore,
until the South Africa’s legislature attends to the clarity of the 2008 SA Companies Act,
this wide oppression remedy may only be marvelled at from a distance, as its
application will be limited by the Predicament created through the English company law.
5.2.2 Quebec Law: BCE Inc. v DebentureHolders
There are numerous cases decided under the oppression remedy. But as one researches
the oppression remedy today, there is one case, in 2006, which often comes up and is
cited in various decisions in a few Canadian provincial courts. The case is BCE Inc. v
284
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DebentureHolders.286 Despite its use by Canadian courts outside of Quebec, this case
should be approached, if at all with utmost caution. Chapter 2 addressed the
importance of ascertaining how a corporation came into existence and the concerns
raised above in Chapter 3 are similarly applicable here. Quebec law differs substantially
from the English Law which gave rise to the Letters Patent statute or the contractarian
statute. Where the source of South African and the rest of Canadian law is English
common law, the source of law in Quebec stems from the Quebec civil law.
One could argue that the same is true for South Africa, which comes from a RomanDutch history. However, South Africa and Quebec differ in that Quebec civil law is still
applied today whereas in South Africa, the Roman-Dutch law is not, it was abandoned
due to its inadequacy.287
During the course of the nineteenth century, South Africa came under the
influence of the surge of industry and trade in England and Europe but the
opening up of the diamond- and gold-fields in the later nineteenth century
English Law began to have a profound influence and this became
pronounced when in 1827 ... Roman Dutch commercial law [which had been
applied since 1795, when the Dutch settlers arrived] was now so inadequate
that the developments of English law were irresistible, especially when all
the judges recently appointed were English and thus familiar with English
mercantile law.
Therefore, I suggest that South Africa consider not only this case, but every case that it
considers, very carefully before application. The Predicament was created on the backs
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of judges not carefully considering the jurisdiction of the cases that they applied.288
Therefore, in order to ensure that South Africa does not end up struggling with statutory
ambiguity and decisions of court that have incorrectly applied legal principles, like
Burland v Earle, careful consideration of cases as well as strict adherence to the clear
division of powers model statute will be required. The statute must be the point of
reference.
In summary, the essence of the oppression remedy is found in the reasonable
expectations of the parties which are not necessary stated on paper. The elements of
the oppression remedy namely “oppressive”, “unfair prejudicial” and “unfair disregards
the interests...” are identified in the search for the reasonable expectations and are
therefore not altogether abandoned. The other aspect of the oppression remedy is the
court’s discretion.

PART II: Court Remedies
The Second Part of the oppression remedy relates to the court’s discretion or judicial
powers. There are a few similarities between section 241 (3) of the CBCA and section
163 (2) of the 2008 SA Companies Act as to the court’s powers to provide a remedy.
However, the list provided is non-exhaustive. The wide discretion was noted in the case
of 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd289
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Section 247 (3) [now s. 248(3)] gives the court tremendous latitude. Subject
to being concerned about interfering as little as possible, a judge should be
able to use his [or her] ingenuity to effect the remedy most suitable to the
situation.
With this tremendous latitude, the South Africa courts have an opportunity to change to
face of the South African corporate law forever, through the proper use of their powers.
The responsibility they also have is to ensure that the cases that are applied are
carefully considered. Section 5(2) of the 2008 SA Companies Act says “[t]o the extent
appropriate, a court interpreting or applying this Act may consider foreign company
law”. Not only are the South African courts given a wide discretion under the section
163 oppression remedy, they are also statutorily empowered to consider foreign
company to the extent they are appropriate.
There are 17 different remedies available, but also note that in both the South African
statute and the CBCA, this list of remedies is non- exhaustive. Of the 17 remedies, South
Africa and Canada share nine. Let us now consider the similarities and differences
between the courts powers under section 241 (3) of the CBCA and section 163 (2) of the
2008 SA Companies Act.
1.

Shared Court Remedy Provisions: Canada and South Africa

The court can issue any of these remedies in addition to the following: it can issue,
change or amend a shareholders’ agreement290 or set aside resolutions291 or even alter

290

Dennis H Peterson, Shareholders Remedies in Canada, loose- leaf (consulted on 21 May
2009), (Toronto: Butterworths Canada, 1960) at 17-111 para 17.189.
291
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the composition of the board of directors.292 Although the order to change the board of
directors may be issued, should only be issued as a last resort.293 Below is a list of the
nine remedies shared in both jurisdictions, Canada and South Africa (in italics).
(a) an order restraining the conduct complained of;294
(c) an order to regulate a corporation’s affairs by amending the articles or by-laws or
creating or amending a unanimous shareholder agreement; under the South African
legislation there is no definition of a unanimous shareholder agreement;295
(e) an order appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or any of the
directors then in office; the South African law further provides for an order declaring
any person delinquent under the relevant section;296
(g) an order directing a corporation, subject to subsection (6), or any other person,
to pay a security holder any part of the monies that the security holder paid for
securities; under the South African provision, although similar it states, an order
directing the company or any other person to restore to a shareholder any part of the
consideration that the shareholder paid for shares, or pay the equivalent value, with
or without conditions;297
(h) an order varying or setting aside a transaction or contract to which a corporation
is a party and compensating the corporation or any other party to the transaction or
contract;298
(i) an order requiring a corporation, within a time specified by the court, to produce
to the court or an interested person financial statements in the form required by
section 155 or an accounting in such other form as the court may determine;299
(j) an order compensating an aggrieved person;300
292
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(k) an order directing rectification of the registers or other records of a corporation
under section 243;301
(n) an order requiring the trial of any issue.302

2.

Contrasting Court Remedy Provisions

The different provisions under each jurisdiction are as follows:
Section 241 (3) of the CBCA
Section 163 (2) of the 2008 SA Companies Act
(b) an order appointing a receiver or
(b) an order appointing a liquidator, if the
receiver-manager;
company appears to be insolvent;
(d) an order directing an issue or
exchange of securities;

(e) an order directing an issue and
exchange of shares;

(f) an order directing a corporation,
subject to subsection (6), or any other
person, to purchase securities of a
security holder;

(c) an order placing the company under
supervision and commencing business
rescue proceedings in terms of
Chapter 6, if the court is satisfied that
the circumstances set out in section
131(4)(a) apply;

(l) an order liquidating and dissolving
the corporation;
(m) an order directing an investigation
under Part XIX to be made; and
Table C: Contrasting statutory powers of the court to grant relief under the oppression remedy in the CBCA
and the 2008 SA Companies Act.

Section 163 (2) (b) allows the court to appoint a liquidator if the company is insolvent,
whereas section 241(3) (b) allows the court to appoint a receiver, who is not a liquidator
per se, who manages the business for a limited period either to re-establish it on a more
solid economic footing or to liquidate it.303 This receiver resembles South Africa’s
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business rescue practitioner, whom the court may also appoint in terms of section 163
(2), who is tasked with the temporary supervision and management of a company that is
financially distressed.304 The other significant provision is section 241(3) (l) which relates
to liquidation, the court may order a corporation be liquidated, there is no equivalent
section in the 2008 SA Companies Act. Under this provision the continued existence of
the corporation rests with the court. It is a “drastic remedy that should only be invoked
if there is a less invasive mechanism available.”305
Part 1 and Part 2 show how wide this oppression remedy really is and with the
additional statutory empowered discretion of the South African court to seek foreign
company law, the oppression remedy will be the best shareholder remedy South Africa
has ever seen. However, as mentioned previously, the only way South Africa can make
proper use of the oppression remedy is to move away from the Predicament, the lack of
clarity of the statute or else this clearly wide oppression remedy will be vastly limited by
the Predicament that has stifled South African company law.

PART III: Additional aspects of the Oppression Remedy
Does the oppression remedy apply to public corporations and can a majority
shareholder invoke this remedy against a minority shareholder? These answers to
questions regarding these additional aspects may be considered as uncertain. To some
people the answers to these questions may be an unequivocal “No” but that does not
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seem to be the case in Canada. From a South African point of view, this may be an
aspect worth clarifying by legislation if necessary.
1.

Public Corporations

Although the oppression remedy was created with a view to protect shareholders in a
close corporation or private corporations, it could also apply to public corporations as
well. “As a matter of principle, there is no reason to deny relief under the oppression
remedy to corporate stakeholders where the corporation distributes its securities to the
public”.306 This is argued based on the reasoning provided in the Elder v Elder and
Watson Ltd case. The object of the oppression remedy is to remedy the wrong done to a
corporation; therefore it applies to all corporations irrespective of size.307
However, due to one’s ability to sell his or her shares to the public at the sign of
oppression or unfair prejudice, there would be no need for them to use the oppression
remedy. “Nevertheless, even in a public securities market, abuse of dominant power can
depreciate the value of shares...unless corrective action is taken; for example
management could pay unauthorised directors’ fees or adopt defensive tactics which
deny shareholders the prospects of take-over bid premiums.”308 Therefore, the
possibility exists, however the significant aspect is whether the public corporation is
able to establish that those reasonable expectations existed and need the protection
under the oppression remedy.
306
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2.

Majority shareholders

Although the primary purpose of the oppression remedy contemplated by the Dickerson
Committee was to protect minority shareholders, there is nothing in the section which
expressly prohibits a majority shareholder from commencing an oppression action as a
complainant.309 Considering the broad nature of the oppression remedy it would seem
possible that a majority shareholder could be oppressed by a corporation’s directors.310
Nonetheless, in one of the first cases, Vedova v Garden House to decide on a matter
where the claimant or applicant was a non- minority shareholder, the court held that
oppression could only be used by a minority shareholder. Meaning, the oppression
remedy should not be used as a device to mediate between shareholder groups.
“Subsequent cases have made clear that there is no general restriction on the
availability of the remedy based on the size of the applicant's shareholding; the only
question is whether, on the facts, the shareholder was oppressed”. 311
As mentioned above, South Africa would first need to establish its basic corporate law
principles before it can decide on even broader aspects of the oppression remedy. The
oppression remedy is the first step to South Africa’s great reform, a reform that is based
on transparency, accountability and a division of powers. The first step is to achieve the
division of the powers statute.
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Conclusion
This chapter provided a detailed comparison of the both oppression remedies under
sections 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act and section 241 of the CBCA, within the
following categories, standing under the oppression remedy, the scope of the conduct,
standard of corporate conduct, whose interests are being protected and what interests
are being protected in the context of the reasonable expectations of shareholders as
well as the judicial powers. The key aspect of the Canadian oppression remedy is its
growth from the Ebrahimi case to a wide remedy that seeks to enforce reasonable
expectations of shareholders. The enforcement of the reasonable expectations is only
possible where there is a clear statute. A statute that provides for the clear legal rights
of the individuals in a corporation is required. Although South Africa has only recently
adopted the 2008 SA Companies Act, further amendments to the South African
company law are needed in order to take full advantage of this wide remedy. I chose
five sections that will establish the clarity needed in the 2008 SA Companies Act in order
to apply the oppression remedy effectively. These five sections discussed in Chapter 5
relate to:
i.

The Capacity of the Company

ii.

Director’s Powers

iii.

Unanimous Shareholder Agreements

iv.

Evidentiary value of a Shareholders’ ratification

v.

Oppression Remedy
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Chapter 5: Solving the Predicament
Introduction
In an effort to ensure that South Africa is able to take full advantage of its newly
adopted oppression remedy under section 163, recommendations to amend the 2008
SA Companies Act were provided throughout this thesis. The South African company law
as it stands today will still be affected by the Predicament. Therefore, in this chapter all
those recommendations are brought together and applied within the context of the
particular provisions in the 2008 SA Companies Act in order to make the statutory
provisions clearer regarding the duties and powers of individuals within the company.
These suggested provisions are discussed with reference to the Alberta Proposal.312 In
1980, Alberta reformed its Companies Act by adopting the provisions under the CBCA.
Essentially, Alberta developed from a contractarian statute to a division of powers
statute. This is the same situation in South Africa and should the South African
Legislature elect to adopt these suggested provisions, it will mean corporate law
freedom from the shackles of the Predicament313 created under the English company
law.
Therefore in this chapter, I discuss each 2008 SA Companies Act provision relating to
corporate personality or majority rule within the context of the amendments made by

312
313

Alberta Proposal, supra note 137.

The mistaken view of the corporate personality and majority rule as it was applied to
corporations created by a contractarian statute.

125

the Alberta Committee as well as the Dickerson Committee. The suggested provisions
that fall under corporate personality relate to the contractual effect of the articles of the
company, and the capacity and powers of the company. The provisions that fall under
the majority rule relate to directors’ duties, the unanimous shareholder agreement, and
the evidentiary value of shareholder approval. Thereafter, a comparison of these
statutory provisions within each Canadian provincial statute is provided.
1.

Recommendations

Alberta once had a statute that was a contractarian model and now has a statute based
on a division of powers model. In 1980 the Alberta Proposal was published. The
Proposal was a commentary on the whole Act, similar to the Dickerson Report. The
Alberta Committee considered each provision under the CBCA to adopt in their Draft Act
and the reasons for the adoption which included the comments from the Dickerson
Report but were applied within the context of the Alberta Companies Act (contractarian
statute). This is useful to South Africa in light of the type of corporation that Alberta
once had. The particular statutory provisions relating to the capacity of the company,
director’s powers, unanimous shareholder agreements and the evidentiary value of a
shareholder’s approval will now be discussed in the context of the comments in Alberta
Proposal as well as the Dickerson Report.
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1.1

Corporate Personality Provisions

1.1.1. Contractual Effect of the Articles

Before the reform, Alberta had the following provisions under the Alberta Companies
Act,314 which are comparable to the 1973 SA Companies Act regarding the statute-based
contract.
Alberta Companies Act 1980

Effect of incorporation
28 From the date of incorporation
mentioned
in
the
certificate
of
incorporation the subscribers, together
with the other persons that from time to
time become members of the company,
are a corporation by the name contained
in the memorandum, capable of exercising
all the functions of an incorporated
company,

1973 SA Companies Act
Effect of incorporation on company
and members.
65(1) From the date of incorporation stated in
the certificate of incorporation, the subscribers
of the memorandum together with such other
persons as may from time to time become
members of the company, shall be a body
corporate with the name stated in the
memorandum, capable of exercising all the
functions...

Effect of memorandum and articles
29(1) The memorandum and articles,
when registered, bind the company and
the members thereof to the same extent
as if they respectively had been signed and
sealed by each member, and contained
covenants on the part of each member.

65(2) The memorandum and articles shall bind
the company and the members thereof to the
same extent as if they respectively had been
signed by each member, to observe all the
provisions of the memorandum and of the
articles, subject to the provisions of this Act.

Table D: Statutory provisions relating to the statute-based contract in the Alberta Companies Act and the
1973 SA Companies Act compared.

Before the reform, section 29 of the Alberta Companies Act and South Africa’s
equivalent section 65 (2) stated that the memorandum and articles of association are
binding on the company. This is the provision that caused numerous interpretation
314

Alberta Companies Act RSA 1980 cC-20 s28, s 29 (1).
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issues that led to the Predicament.315 So, the Alberta Committee recommended that the
new legislation do away with the provision and remain with the statute as the first point
of reference when seeking the rights and obligations of each shareholder and each
director.
We do not think that it is necessary or desirable to carry forward into the
proposed ABCA any statutory contract between shareholders or between
company and shareholders. The statute should set out the rights and
obligations of shareholders, directors and officers, and should provide
remedies when those rights are infringed. There is no need to resort to the
artificial implications of a contract and indeed the notion that there is a
contract likely to interfere with the proper working out of rights and
obligations which arise because of relationships, the nature of which is
determined by law. The only exception which we would make to that
proposition is the unanimous shareholder agreement; a device which is
intended to be used where the parties wish to bind themselves to something
which would depart from general law, done consensually.316
Despite the South African company law reform through the 2008 SA Companies Act it
has retained the statute-based contract and it seems as though this contract will be
applied in the same way as its predecessor under section 65 (2) of the 1973 SA
Companies Act. South Africa’s new statute-based contract is provided below, with the
commentary on how it is intended to be applied.
s.15(6) A company’s Memorandum of Incorporation, and any rules of the
company, are binding—

315

The Predicament refers to the lack of clarity in the statute regarding the right and duties of
the individuals in a corporation that has led to the mistaken view of the principles of corporate
personality and majority, as discussed in Chapter 3.
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(a) between the company and each shareholder;
(b) between or among the shareholders of the company; and
(c) between the company and—
(i) each director or prescribed officer of the company; or
(ii) any other person serving the company as a member of the audit
committee or as a member of a committee of the board,
in the exercise of their respective functions within the company.
The Commentary on the 2008 SA Companies Act says the following.
The Memorandum and rules are binding between the company and each
shareholder, between the shareholders of the company and between the
company and each director or prescribed officer or other person serving the
company as a member of the audit committee or as a member of a
committee of the board in respect of their respective functions [s. 15 (6)].
This relationship is similar to that in terms of the 1973 Act where the
Memorandum and Articles had contractual force between the company
and its members, i.e. those who were such at its inception and those who
became such at any time thereafter, but only in their capacity as members.
Considering the difficulty that arises when it comes to this statute-based contract, which
includes the application of partnership principles and corporate personality all while
confusing the concept of a corporation being separate and distinct from its members, I
strongly suggest that the binding aspect of the Memorandum of Incorporation be
removed. The Memorandum of Incorporation in South Africa will therefore contain only
matters relating to the company, for example, it name, the classes or number of shares,
whether the issue or transfer or ownership of the share are to be restricted and the
number of directors.317

317

I refer to the CBCA Part 2, section 6, as it identifies the contents of the Articles of
Incorporation: (1) Articles of incorporation shall follow the form that the Director fixes and shall
set out, in respect of the proposed corporation, the name of the corporation; the classes and
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1.1.2 Capacity and Powers of the Company
With the aim of seeking a division of powers statute under the 2008 SA Companies Act,
the deletion of the statute-based contract was recommended. In order to ensure that
South Africa does not continue with the Predicament let us consider how the 2008 SA
Companies Act describes the company under section 19 of the 2008 SA Companies Act.
ABCA
Capacity and Powers s16 (1) A corporation
has the capacity and, subject to this Act, the
rights, powers and privileges of a natural
person.

2008 SA Companies Act
Legal status of the company, s19 the
company—
(a) is a juristic person, which exists
continuously until its name is removed from
the companies register in accordance with this
Act;
(b) has all of the legal powers and capacity of
an individual318, except to the extent that—
i.

ii.

a juristic person319 is incapable of
exercising any such power, or having
any such capacity; or
the company’s Memorandum of
Incorporation provides otherwise;

Table E: Section 16 of the ABCA and section 19 of the 2008 SA Companies Act compared.

The Alberta Business Corporations Act320 describes the corporation as a natural person
and the 2008 SA Companies Act describes the company as an individual. An individual

any maximum number of shares that the corporation is authorized to issue, the number of
directors as well as any restrictions on the businesses that the corporation may carry on.
318

2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 1 at s1 ‘‘individual’’ means a natural person;

319

2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 115 at s1 “juristic person’’ includes—
(a) a foreign company; and
(b) a trust, irrespective of whether or not it was established within or outside the
Republic;
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Business Corporations Act, RSA 1990, c B-9 [ABCA].
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under section 1 of the 2008 SA Companies Act means a natural person. However, under
the 2008 SA Companies Act, the company’s corporate personality is limited by the
provisions of the Memorandum of Incorporation. I reiterate a company is a legal
person.321 Its existence is derived directly from the statute, therefore it cannot be
limited by a statute-based contract, or else the Predicament will be maintained. I
therefore suggest that either an equivalent to section 16 (1) of the ABCA is provided
under the 2008 SA Companies Act or at the very least section 19 (1) (b) is deleted or
both an inclusion of section 16 (1) and the deletion of section 19 (1) (b) is effected in
order develop the South African company law.
1.2

Majority Rule: Provisions

Now that we have dealt with the first part of the Predicament, namely the mistaken
view of corporate personality let us proceed to the second part, the mistaken view of
majority rule. Majority rule is considered in the context of the directors’ duties and
powers, the unanimous shareholder agreement and the evidentiary value of
shareholder approval. The Alberta Committee’s recommendation on the division of
powers of directors and shareholders was that the ABCA follow the CBCA model, that is
to provide statutory powers to directors as well as a statutory limitation on their powers
through the shareholders’ adoption of a Unanimous Shareholder Agreement. This

321

“Company” in this context refers to a juristic person. For the sake of consistency with the
2008 SA Companies Act, I have opted to use the word company when discussing a juristic person
under this South African company law statute.
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division of powers statute model thereby effectively provided for the shareholders
powers as well as the directors powers which were in no way subject to a contract.322
ABCA

2008 SA Companies Act

Directors s.101(1) Subject to any unanimous
shareholder agreement, the directors shall
manage or supervise the management of the
business and affairs of a corporation.

Directors s.66 The business and affairs of a
company must be managed by or under the
direction of its board, which has the authority
to exercise all of the powers and perform any
of the functions of the company, except to the
extent that this Act or the company’s
Memorandum of Incorporation provides
otherwise.

Unanimous shareholder agreement

No Unanimous
equivalent.

shareholder

agreement

s.146(1) A unanimous shareholder agreement
may provide for any or all of the following:
(a) the regulation of the rights and liabilities of
the shareholders, as shareholders, among
themselves or between themselves and any
other party to the agreement;
(b) the regulation of the election of directors;
(c) the management of the business and affairs
of the corporation, including the restriction or
abrogation, in whole or in part, of the powers
of the directors;
(d) any other matter that may be contained in
a unanimous shareholder agreement pursuant
to any other provision of this Act.

Court
approval
of
stay,
dismissal, No Court approval of stay, dismissal,
discontinuance or settlement:
discontinuance or settlement equivalent
s.243(1) An application made or an action provision.
brought or intervened in under this Part shall
not be stayed or dismissed by reason only that
it is shown that an alleged breach of a right or
duty owed to the corporation or its subsidiary
has been or may be approved by the
322
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document, governed by statutory not contractual rules; Duha Printers (Western) Ltd v The
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shareholders of the corporation or the
subsidiary, but evidence of approval by the
shareholders may be taken into account by the
Court in making an order under section 215,
241 or 242.
Table F: Provisions of the ABCA and the 2008 SA Companies Act compared.

1.3

Directors’ duties

ABCA

2008 SA Companies Act

Directors s.101(1) Subject to any unanimous
shareholder agreement, the directors shall
manage or supervise the management of the
business and affairs of a corporation.

Directors s.66 The business and affairs of a
company must be managed by or under the
direction of its board, which has the authority
to exercise all of the powers and perform any
of the functions of the company, except to the
extent that this Act or the company’s
Memorandum of Incorporation provides
otherwise.

Table G: A comparison between the provisions relating to Directors’ duties under the ABCA and the
2008 SA Companies Act.

Section 66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act provides for the director’s duties and powers.
This is new for South Africa as the powers of directors were delegated by the
shareholders under the memorandum and articles of association. Today, directors
duties and powers under section 66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act are derived directly
from the statute; this is the same with section 101 (1) of ABCA. However, the difference
between the ABCA and the 2008 SA Companies Act is that the statutory powers under
section 66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act are limited by the Memorandum of
Incorporation, the statute-based contract. Before delving into the concerns this section
may bring to the South African company law, let us consider the commentary on the
South African section 66.
It can be argued that section 66 merely regulates the division or allocation of
responsibilities between directors and shareholders subject to the
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qualifications under the MOI [Assuming that the shareholders are the
company]. The effect of section 66 would, it is submitted, therefore also
mean that, unless the qualifications of section 66 are complied with, the
board of directors is the “ultimate” organ of the company. 323
It is clear that the division of powers statute model was the goal of the South African
reform however; there will not be much reform unless the limitation on the directors’
duties by the memorandum of incorporation is removed. The commentary states that
“unless the qualifications of section 66 are complied with, the board of directors is the
“ultimate” organ of the company,” this means that the shareholders through the
memorandum of incorporation are the ones limiting or qualifying the directors’ duties.
Although the shareholders are the ones who may limit the directors’ duties, the
shareholder cannot identify the limited directors’ duties in the memorandum of
incorporation. The memorandum of incorporation is not supposed to be the document
that encompasses the interest of the shareholders as well as the company, because this
leads to the uncertainty in identifying the powers of the individuals within the company.
The clearer the statute is, the clearer it is to identity the duties and powers of the
individuals within the company. If the responsibilities of the shareholders and the rules
that govern the company are put in one document, confusion is created because of the
lack of clarity. This is the Predicament, which can be illustrated in an example.

323

Henochsberg, supra note 34 at s 66.
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The Predicament in 2012

Yuri is injured severely on the head. The doctors inform him that his injuries are so
severe he might end up in a coma. On a piece of paper in the hospital, Yuri quickly sets
out who will be responsible for his affairs in the event of a coma (“Document”). Two
days later his health deteriorates and Yuri ends up in a coma. The doctor informs Yuri’s
family and refers them to the Document.
The Document simply states that, Yuri’s sister, Ruth will handle all his affairs in the
meantime but that Yuri’s brother, Ben can limit some of Ruth’s obligations if he wishes.
Ben cannot decide to impose his wishes on Yuri. Yuri was clear as to what he wanted
and set it out in the Document. Yuri and Ben are two different people. Therefore, Ben
cannot decide he will amend Yuri’s Document, because only Yuri can make changes to
the Document. All Ben can do, is to discuss with Ruth what responsibilities or duties
each will take on in compliance with Yuri’s Document regarding his affairs.
Let us apply the example to the 2008 SA Companies Act, wherein:


The Document represents the Memorandum of Incorporation



Yuri’s sister, Ruth represents the Directors.



Yuri’s Brother, Ben represents the Shareholders.



Yuri represents the company, a legal person.

This means that Yuri and Ben are considered as a single person, if the wording of section
66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act is applied to the example. This conclusion is impossible
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as Ben and Yuri are different people. Similarly, in the case of company, a shareholder
and company are not the same person even though they share one document. The only
way to maintain a division of powers statute is to have the shareholders agree on the
restricted director’s duties, and this would be captured in a written lawful agreement,
which the CBCA refers to as the unanimous shareholder agreement. The allowance for
the formation of this agreement must be stated in the Act (Yuri’s Document). The
Unanimous Shareholder Agreement in comparison to an ordinary Shareholders’
Agreement is elaborated upon below.
1.4

Unanimous Shareholders’ Agreement

A Unanimous Shareholder Agreement is a corporate contract governed by statutory
rules. The Alberta Proposal clearly indicates the function of the Unanimous Shareholder
Agreement in a corporation. The Alberta Committees said “there are some general rules
that are provided by the CBCA which relate to the relationships among the
shareholders, directors and officers.324 In discussing the statutory provisions relating to
the Unanimous Shareholder Agreement below, the provisions of the CBCA are used.
1.4.1 Statutory Provisions
The rules are put in place to balance the conflicting interests of those involved in the
business corporation and to provide for the efficient conduct of its business. 325 If
however, the shareholders want a different rule or an additional rule and if they all
agree and the change does not prejudice outsiders, the shareholders, under this
324
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agreement can decide what rules will protect their interests and promote business
efficacy.”326 The Unanimous Shareholder Agreement differs substantially from a
shareholders’ agreement. The CBCA describes the Unanimous Shareholder Agreement
as follows.
s146 (1) An otherwise lawful written agreement among all the
shareholders of a corporation, or among all the shareholders and one or
more persons who are not shareholders, that restricts, in whole or in part,
the powers of the directors to manage, or supervise the management of,
the business and affairs of the corporation is valid.
Declaration by single shareholder
(2) If a person who is the beneficial owner of all the issued shares of a
corporation makes a written declaration that restricts in whole or in part
the powers of the directors to manage, or supervise the management of,
the business and affairs of the corporation, the declaration is deemed to be
a unanimous shareholder agreement.
Constructive party
(3) A purchaser or transferee of shares subject to a unanimous shareholder
agreement is deemed to be a party to the agreement.
When no notice given
(4) If notice is not given to a purchaser or transferee of the existence of a
unanimous shareholder agreement, in the manner referred to in subsection
49(8) or otherwise, the purchaser or transferee may, no later than 30 days
after they become aware of the existence of the unanimous shareholder
agreement, rescind the transaction by which they acquired the shares.
Rights of shareholder
(5) To the extent that a unanimous shareholder agreement restricts the
powers of the directors to manage, or supervise the management of, the
business and affairs of the corporation, parties to the unanimous
326
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shareholder agreement who are given that power to manage or supervise
the management of the business and affairs of the corporation have all the
rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a director of the corporation,
whether they arise under this Act or otherwise, including any defences
available to the directors, and the directors are relieved of their rights,
powers, duties and liabilities, including their liabilities under section 119, to
the same extent.
As mentioned above, the Unanimous Shareholder Agreement (“the USA”) is not the
same as a shareholders’ agreement. The difference is that the USA provides that the
shareholders may restrict the directors’ powers. In South Africa, if this agreement is
adopted, it could be used to qualify the directors’ powers under section 66 of the 2008
SA Companies Act and maintain the division of powers statute model. The important
aspects of the USA are that the director’s powers are limited and the duties that no
longer fall on the director become the responsibility of the shareholder, under the USA.
This way all duties are accounted for, either by the directors under section 101, or by
the shareholders under section 146 of the ABCA or section 146 of the CBCA. This
provides a clear division of powers. In addition to carrying the responsibility of the duty
that the shareholders limited, each shareholder will also be held to the same standard
as any director in respect of that duty. This would mean that the shareholders would
have a fiduciary duty toward the company in respect of that restricted duty. This
criterion for the directors is similar in the ABCA327 and the 2008 SA Companies Act.328
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ABCA section 122, every director and officer of a corporation in exercising the director’s or
officer’s powers and discharging the director’s or officer’s duties shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation, and
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in
comparable circumstances.
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The Unanimous Shareholder Agreement also binds a purchaser or transferee under
section 146 (4) of the CBCA. “Consequently, a transferee without notice would take
shares free of any restrictions contained in a shareholders agreement”.329 The Dickerson
Report suggested that for the sake of good practice, the shareholder’s certificate be
endorsed with a statement regarding the existence of any unanimous shareholders
agreement.330
An additional section which was also included in the Dickerson Committee Draft Act but
not included under section 146 of the CBCA, relates to pre-emptive rights under the
Unanimous Shareholder Agreement. The reason this provision was included was “to
maintain the integrity of the unanimous shareholder agreement.”331 According to the
Dickerson Committee it seemed sensible to include this section at least until the legal
profession in Canada became accustomed to these agreements, as the need for a pre-

328

2008 SA Companies Act section 76 a director of a company, when acting in that

capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director—
(a) in good faith and for a proper purpose;
(b) in the best interests of the company; and
(c) with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of
a person—
(i) carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those
carried out by that director; and
(ii) having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director.
329

Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 100.

330

Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 99.

331

Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 99.
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emptive right332 will often be overlooked. In the context of South Africa an inclusion of
this last section in the Act, is recommended and would read as follows,
(6) [n]otwithstanding any provision in the memorandum, a unanimous
shareholder agreement is deemed to confer on every shareholder who is
party thereto the pre-emptive right referred to in section 39 (2) unless that
right is expressly limited or excluded in the agreement.
It is now clear that the USA is different from a shareholders’ agreement, in that the USA
restricts the powers of the director’s under the Act and is created by the shareholders
unanimously. More importantly in regards to the powers restricted, the shareholders
acquire those powers under the same standard as the directors. I suggest that South
Africa adopt an equivalent provision and with the inclusion of this agreement to the
2008 SA Companies Act, the division of powers will be maintained.
1.5

Evidentiary value of shareholder approval

Another section in the CBCA which is related to the oppression remedy is section 242.
The equivalent section is provided in section 243 of the ABCA. This section reduces the
effect of shareholder approval of managerial misbehaviour.
s242 (1) An application made or an action brought or intervened in under
this Part shall not be stayed or dismissed by reason only that it is shown that
an alleged breach of a right or duty owed to the corporation or its subsidiary
has been or may be approved by the shareholders of such body corporate,
but evidence of approval by the shareholders may be taken into account by
the court in making an order under section 214, 240 or 241 [CBCA,
Oppression Remedy].
332

A pre-emptive right is a right held by a shareholder that is exercised when a shareholder sells
his shares. Those shares must first be offered to the existing shareholders before it is offered to
any other person.
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According to the Dickerson Report, this section “abrogates that aspect of the rule of
Foss v Harbottle that bars a shareholder from complaining of an alleged misconduct on
the ground that the impugned act might be authorised or ratified at a meeting of
shareholders.”333 Instead of setting out a specific rule declaring how an act of the
directors may be ratified, the Dickerson Committee thought it “better to characterise
shareholder ratification or waiver as an evidentiary issue which in effect compels the
court to go behind the constitutional structure of the corporation and examine the real
issues.”334 The South African legislature will do well to consider the provision or an
equivalent provision for South Africa, in light of the discussion in Chapter 3.
1.6

South African Oppression Remedy

2008 SA Companies Act

ABCA

Oppression Remedy: s.163 is substantially
similar to section 241 of the CBCA.
(1) A shareholder or a director of a
company may apply to a court for relief
if—

Oppression Remedy: s. 242 is identical to
section 241 of the CBCA.

(a)
any act or omission of the company, or a
related person, has had a result that is
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or
that unfairly disregards the interests of,
the applicant;

(1) A complainant may apply to the Court for
an order under this section.
(2) If, on an application under subsection (1),
the Court is satisfied that in respect of a
corporation or any of its affiliates
(a)
any act or omission of the corporation or any
of its affiliates effects a result,

(b)
(b)
the business of the company, or a related the business or affairs of the corporation or
person, is being or has been carried on or any of its affiliates are or have been carried on
333

Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 164 para 487.

334

Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 164.
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conducted in a manner that is oppressive or conducted in a manner, or
or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly
disregards the interests of, the applicant; (c)
or
the powers of the directors of the corporation
or any of its affiliates are or have been
exercised in a manner
(c)
the powers of a director or prescribed
officer of the company, or a person related
to the company, are being or have been
exercised in a manner that is oppressive
or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly
disregards the interests of, the applicant.

that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or
that unfairly disregards the interests of any
security holder, creditor, director or officer,
the Court may make an order to rectify the
matters complained of.

Table H: A comparison between the oppression remedy provision under the ABCA and the 2008 SA
Companies Act.

The Alberta Commission noted that “the reorganisation and extension of the minority
shareholders remedies for abuse of powers by those in control of the corporation are
among the most important reforms which the ABCA makes”.335 With reference to the
derivative action (also known as the statutory representative action) and the oppression
remedy, the Committee said that the provisions were intended to do away with the
difficulties created by the Rule in Foss v Harbottle, and the remedies, both the statutory
representative action and the oppression remedy improve the position of the minority
shareholder vis-à-vis the majority.336 It is hoped that South Africa’s decision to include
this section will bring about an improved minority shareholder remedy by putting the
section to its full use and capability.

335

Alberta Proposal, supra note 137 at 138.

336

Alberta Proposal, supra note 137 at 138.
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2

Comparable Statutory Provisions

This part of the chapter provides the equivalent provisions within the various provinces
statutes in Canada. The provincial statutes reviewed below are from Manitoba337, New
Brunswick338, Newfoundland and Labrador339, the North West Territories340, Nunavut341,
Ontario342, Saskatchewan343, Yukon344, Alberta (both the Companies Act 1980 and the
ABCA), British Columbia345 and Nova Scotia346. The provincial statutes are then
separated into their original types of corporate statutes, either Letters Patent or
contractarian. Only Alberta’s old and new statutes will be provided considering their
significance to the thesis. The provincial legislative provisions are limited to the five
sections referred to earlier, capacity of company, director’s powers, unanimous
shareholders’ agreements, the evidentiary value of shareholder approval and the
oppression remedy.

337

Corporations Act, CCSM c C225.

338

Business Corporations Act, SNB 1981, c B-9.1.

339

Corporations Act, RSNL 1990, c C-36.

340

Business Corporations Act, SNWT 1996, c 19.

341

Business Corporations Act, SNWT (Nu) 1996, c 19.

342

Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B.16.

343

Corporations Act, Chapter B-10, The Revised Statutes of Saskatchewan, 2012 c.21.

344

Business Corporations Act, RSY 2002, c 20.

345

Business Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57 [BCBCA].

346

Companies Act (NS), RSNS 1989, c 81 [NSCA].
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Statute

(1)
Subscribers
are the body
corporate

(2)
The articles
shall bind all
members.

(3)
Capacity
of
Corporation/
Legal status of
company

(4)
Director’s
powers
to
manage
corporation

(5)
Unanimous
Shareholders
Agreement
(6)
Shareholder
Approval in
Court

(7)
Oppression
Remedy

Canada
CBCA

-

-

s. 15(1)

s.102(1)

s. 146

s.241

Manitoba
BCA

-

New
Brunswick
BCA

-

Newfoundland
and
Labrador
BCA

-

NorthWest
Territories
BCA

-

Nunavut
BCA
Ontario
BCA
(“OBCA”)

-

-

s. 15 (1)

s.102

s.148 (1) (c)

-

-

s. 15

s. 115

s.108 (2) & s.248
(3)
(includes
threatened
oppressive
s. 249 (1)
conduct)

Saskatche
wan BCA

-

-

s. 15 (1)

s. 97 (1)

s. 140(2)

Yukon BCA

-

s. 242(1)
-

s. 15(1)

s. 97(1)

s. 140

s. 234

s. 235(1)
-

s. 13 (1)

s. 60

s. 99 (3)

s. 166

s. 167 (1)
-

s. 27 (1)

s.167

s.245 (2)

s.371

s.372(1)

-

s. 15 (1)

s.102

s. 148 (1) (c)

s. 243

s. 244 (1)
s.243

s. 234

s. 235 (1)
-

s. 18 (1)

s. 102

s. 148 (1) (c)
s. 244 (1)

Table I: Summary of Comparable Provisions under the Canadian Federal and Provincial statutes

s. 243
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The list below provides the Canadian provincial corporate law statutes that developed
from the English or a contractarian model to a division of powers model (CBCA) or
retained their contractarian model statute. Alberta changed from a contractarian
statute to a statute based on the division of powers. British Columbia still has the
contractarian statute but provides a limited scope of application to its oppression
remedy. Lastly, Nova Scotia has retained its contractarian statute but has incorporated
the wide oppression remedy verbatim from section 241 of the CBCA.
Statute

(1)
Subscribers
are the body
corporate

(2)
The articles
shall bind all
members.

(3)
Capacity
of
Corporation/
Legal status of
company

(4)
Director’s
powers to
manage
corporation

(5)
Unanimous
Shareholders
Agreement
(6)
Shareholder
Approval in
Court

(7)
Oppression
Remedy

Alberta
Companies
1980
Alberta
BCA
(“ABCA”)
British
Columbia
BCA
(“BCBCA”)

s.28

s.29(1)

-

-

-

-

s.17

s.19(3)

-

Nova
Scotia
Companies

s.26

s.24(1)

s. 26 (8)

-

-

s.16(1)

s.101

s.146

s. 242

s. 243
s.136

-

s.227
(limited by
(limited to
the articles)
conduct that
is
only
oppressive
to
the
S 233 (6)
shareholder
(Only
applicable to but includes
cases
of provision for
threatened
statutory
representati oppressive
ve action or conduct).
derivative
action).
s.147
s.5 of the
under
Third
Table
A
Schedule
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Statute

(1)
Subscribers
are the body
corporate

(2)
The articles
shall bind all
members.

(3)
Capacity
of
Corporation/
Legal status of
company

Act
(“NSCA”)

(4)
Director’s
powers to
manage
corporation

(5)
Unanimous
Shareholders
Agreement
(6)
Shareholder
Approval in
Court

(7)
Oppression
Remedy

First
Schedule

s.7 of the exactly
Third
drawn from
Schedule
the CBCA

Table J: Specific statutory provisions from the ABCA, BCBCA and NSCA.

South African company law statutory provisions
Statute

(1)
Subscribers
are the body
corporate

1973
SA s. 65(1)
Companies
Act
2008
SA Companies
Act

(2)
The articles
shall bind all
members

(3)
Capacity
of
Corporation/
Legal status of
company

(4)
Director’s
powers to
manage
corporation

(5)
Unanimous
Shareholders
Agreement
(6)
Shareholder
Approval in
Court

(7)
Oppression
Remedy

s. 65(2)

-

-

-

-

s. 15(6)

s.19(1) (b) (i)

s.66

-

(limited
“...to
the
extent
provided by
the
articles”)

-

s. 163

Table K: Specific statutory provisions in the 1973 SA Companies Act and the 2008 SA Companies
Act.

Interpretation of the Table

The aim of this table is to show consistency throughout the Canadian legislative
spectrum in relation to the fundamental principles of corporate personality and majority
rule, in light of the provinces particular type of corporation (Letters Patent statute or
contractarian statute).
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Columns (1), (2) and (3) deal with the capacity of the company and the Directors’
powers; they represent the corporation principle. Columns (4) (5) and (6) represent the
principle of majority rule, through the provision of a unanimous shareholders’
agreement and the evidentiary value of shareholder approval. Columns (1) and (2) were
inserted to indicate the correlation between the existence of the oppression remedy
and the statute-based contract from a contractarian or English statute. In the case of a
Letters Patent statute, the statute did not have any shareholder remedy available.347
If South Africa is to take full advantage of the vast number of cases under the Canadian
oppression remedy, it would not be able to do so if it maintained the contract provision.
The BCBCA and NSCA both have retained their contractarian statute and each statute
has a shareholder remedy provision. The BCBCA has limited the application of the
oppression remedy, it only applies to shareholders and the conduct is limited to
oppressive conduct. The NSCA adopted the wide CBCA remedy.
If South Africa decides not to include the recommendations, the South African courts
will only be limited to Canadian cases decided under the BCBCA and NSCA and the
Predicament will still be maintained within the South African company law despite the
knowledge, now, of its existence. In this case, I would question the true extent of the
South Africa’s reform of 2008 SA Companies Act and its future development.

347

The Letters Patent statute provisions of the various provinces, before they adopted the CBCA
model, were not provided as this chapter only deals with contractarian statutes, from which the
South African company law has developed.
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Conclusion
The recommendations made in this chapter aim to contribute to the further
development of the South African company law, in light of the Predicament identified in
Chapter 3. This chapter discussed each provision that will assist in clarifying the 2008 SA
Companies Act. The recommendations for the 2008 SA Companies Act in this chapter
were attained from the commentaries in the Alberta Proposal, the Dickerson Report as
well as statutory provisions of the ABCA and CBCA. The reason the Alberta Proposal was
used was based on the similarity between Alberta and South Africa, in their
development from contractarian model statutes to a division of powers model statute.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Predicament is not about the method of incorporation
but about the lack of clarity of the statute. This chapter provided a solution to the
Predicament through clarity of statutory provision relating to Directors duties and the
shareholders’ duties- to the extent that the directors’ duties are limited by the
shareholders under a unanimous shareholder agreement.
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CONCLUSION
As far back as 1850, uncertainty has existed in the establishment or understanding of
corporations in law. James Grant in Grant on Corporations: A Practical Treatise on the
Law of Corporations, says “[i]n no branch of law is it of more importance to set out with
correct and definite ideas of principles, than in that which relates to corporations.” 348
The importance of understanding the fundamental principles of corporate personality
and majority rule cannot be overemphasized. Corporations are created in various ways
and this thesis identified how Canadian corporate law has developed from corporations
created by Letters Patent statutes as well as how English and South African company
law have developed from corporations created by a contractarian statute.
Due to the relationship between English and South African company law, South Africa
adopted the Predicament from the English company law. The Predicament is the lack of
clarity in the statute that led to the lack of clarity in the interpretation of the
fundamental principles of the corporate personality and majority rule. Judges did not
apply or seek the statute as the point of reference when considering the powers, duties
or rights of the individual in a corporation created by contractarian statute. The
Predicament is still evident in the South African company law today.
It is this Predicament that has led to previous inadequate shareholder remedies within
the South African company law. In May 2011, South Africa adopted a new Companies
Act 71 of 2008. The new Companies Act does not, however, address the Predicament.
348

Grant on Corporations, supra note 30 at 1.
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The statute remains unclear as to the duties and powers of each individual in a
corporation. However, considering the infancy of the statute, South Africa has time to
develop and clarify its statute. It is only through the clarity of the statute and the strict
application of the statute by the courts that South Africa will be able to overcome this
Predicament and ultimately provide better remedies for shareholders through section
163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act.
As we consider the resemblance of section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act to section
241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, it cannot be denied that the oppression
remedy in South Africa was adopted from the Canada Business Corporations Act. The
Canadian oppression remedy was created in order to provide relief for oppression or
unfair prejudice arising as a consequence of the strict compliance with the statute or as
a consequence of each individual exercising his or her duty as identified clearly in the
statute. This is why it is crucial that the statute state the rights and duties of the
individual clearly.
However, as long as the South African company law statute remains as is without the
clarity required to identify the powers or the duties of the individuals in a corporation,
the application of the South African oppression remedy will not reach its full potential.
The responsibility to provide this statutory clarity rests with the South African
Legislature.
This thesis therefore not only provided a comparison between the oppression remedy in
South Africa and Canada but also identified the key to the Predicament. This thesis
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addressed the historical development of the South African and Canadian corporate law
as well as the origin of this Predicament. It discussed the statutory provisions of the
oppression remedy and lastly provided recommendations to the 2008 SA Companies Act
as a solution to the Predicament.
This is an exciting time for South African company law. It is a time that is uncertain as
the country gets to grips with the 2008 SA Companies Act but more importantly it is an
opportunity to develop. South Africa has an opportunity to review the basics and
fundamentals of its company law. This thesis marks the beginning of this journey.

151

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Canada
LEGISLATION
Business Corporations Act, RSA 1990, c B-9.
Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B.16.
Business Corporations Act, RSS 1978, c B-10.
Business Corporations Act, RSY 2002, c 20.
Business Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57.
Business Corporations Act, SNB 1981, c B-9.1.
Business Corporations Act, SNWT 1996, c 19.
Business Corporations Act, SNWT (Nu) 1996, c 19.
Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44.
Companies Act (NS), RSNS 1989, c 81.
Companies Act, RSA 2000, c C-21.
Corporations Act, CCSM 1987, c 225.
Corporations Act, RSNL 1990, c C-36.
JURISPRUDENCE
820099 Ontario Inc. v Harold E Ballard Ltd (1991), 3 BLR (2d) 113 (Ont Gen Div).
Beatty v North-West Transportation Company Limited [1884] 6 OR 300.
Beatty v North West Transportation Company Limited, 1886 SCC 598.
BCE v 1976 DebentureHolders, 2008 SCC 68.
Brant Investments Limited v KeepRite Inc., [1991] 3 OR (3d) 289 (Ont CA).
Duha Printers (Western) Ltd v The Queen (1998), 159 DLR (4th) 457 (Sup Ct).
Loveridge Holdings v King-Pin Ltd (1992), 5 BLR (2d) 195. (Ont Gen Div).
Krynen v Bugg [2003] OJ 1209, 64 OR (3d) 393 (Ont Sup Ct).
North West Transportation Company Limited v Beatty [1885] 11 Ont App R 205.
Re Alldrew Holdings Ltd. v Nibro Holdings (1993), 16 OR (3d) 718 (Ont Gen Div).
Re Mason and Intercity Properties Ltd. (1987), 59 OR (2d) 631 (Ont CA).
Re Sidaplex-Plastic Suppliers Inc. v Elta Group Inc. (1998), 40 OR (3d) 563 (Ont CA).

152

SECONDARY MATERIAL: MONOGRAPHS
Dickerson Robert, Howard John & Getz Leon. Proposal for a New Business Corporations
Law for Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) vol. 1.
Koehnen Markus. Oppression and Related Remedies (Toronto: Thomson Canada Limited,
2004)
Morritt David, Bjorkquist Sonia & Coleman Allan. The Oppression Remedy (Aurora:
Canada Law Book, 2004).
Nicholls Christopher. Corporate law (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery Publication Ltd,
2005).
Peterson Dennis. Shareholders Remedies in Canada, loose- leaf (consulted on 21 May
2009), (Toronto: Butterworths Canada, 1960).
Proposals for a new Alberta Business Corporations Act, vol.1 Report No. 36 (Edmonton:
Institute of Law Research and Reform, 1980).
Stewart JL. Handbook on Canadian Company Law, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell Company
Limited, 1960).
Welling Bruce. Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles 3d ed (London, Ont:
Scribbles Publishing, 2006)
Welling Bruce, Smith Lionel & Rotman Leonard. Canadian Corporate Law: Cases, Notes
& Materials, 4th ed (Markham: Lexis Nexis Canada Inc, 2010).
SECONDARY MATERIAL: ARTICLES
Ben-Ishai Stephanie & Puri Poonam. “The Canadian Oppression Remedy Judicially
Considered: 1995- 2001” (2004) 30 Queen’s LJ 79.
Vanduzer Anthony. “Who May Claim Relief from Oppression: The Complainant in
Canadian Corporate Law” (1993) 25 Ottawa L Rev 463.

South Africa
LEGISLATION
Companies Act, (S Afr), No 46 of 1926
Companies Act, (S Afr), No 46 of 1926 as amended by Companies Act, (S Afr), No 37 of
1950.
Companies Act, (S Afr), No 61 of 1973.
Companies Act, (S Afr), No 71 of 2008.

153

Electricity Act, (S Afr), No 40 of 1958.
Electricity Amendment Act, (S Afr), No 46 of 1994.
JURISPRUDENCE
Aspek Pipe Co (Pty) Ltd and Another v Mauerberger and Others [1968] 1 S Afr LR 517
(Cape Prov Div).
Bader v Weston [1967] 1 S Afr LR 134 (Cape Prov Div).
Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Limited [1995] 2 All SA 543 (S Afr
SC).
Dadoo Limited v Krugersdorp Municipal Council [1920] AD 530 (S Afr SC).
Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd v Anglo Transvaal Collieries [1979] 3 S Afr LR 713 (Wit
Local Div).
Garden Province Investment v Aleph (Pty) Ltd [1979] 2 Sfr LR 525, (D&C Local Div).
Hickman v Oban Investments [2010] ZAGPJHC 9.
Investors Mutual Funds Ltd v Empisal (South Africa) Ltd (1979) 3 S Afr LR 170 (Wit Local
Div).
Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd
[2012] ZAGPJHC 116.
Louw v Nel [2011] 2 S Afr L 172 (S Afr SC).
McMillan v Pott[2011] 1 S Afr LR 511 (WCC).
Porteus v Kelly [1975] 1 All SA 176 (Wit Local Div).
Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Company [1969] 3 S Afr LR 629 (S Afr SC).
Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation [1994] 2 All SA 11 (S Afr SC).
SECONDARY MATERIAL: MONOGRAPHS
Gibson, JTR & Gibson, RG. South African Mercantile and Company Law, 4th ed (Cape
Town: Juta & Co Ltd, 1977).
Hahlo HR. The South African Company Law through the Cases (Cape Town: Juta & Co
Ltd, 1977).
SECONDARY MATERIAL: ARTICLES
Beuthin RC. “Company Law” (1967) Ann Surv S Afr L 230.

154

Girvin Steven D. “The Antecedents of South African Company Law” (1992) 13:1 J Legal
Hist 63-77.
South African Department of Trade and Industry. South African Company Law Reform
for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform (S Afr Government
Gazette: 26493, June 2004).
OTHER MATERIALS
Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2011).
Blackman MS. Law of South Africa vol 4:1 (Durban: Butterworths, 1995).
Blackman MS. Law of South Africa vol 4:2 (Durban: Butterworths, 1995).

England/UK
LEGISLATION
Companies Act, 1862 (UK), 25 & 26 Vict c 89.
Companies Act, 1948 (UK), 11 & 12 Geo VI, c 38.
Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844 (UK), 7 & 8 Vict, c 110.
Limited Liability Act, 1855 (UK), 18 & 19 Vict, c 133.
JURISPRUDENCE
Aron Salomon v A Salomon and Company Limited [1897] AC 22 HL (Eng).
Broderip v Salomon (1894) [1895] 2 Ch 323.
Burland v Earle (1901) [1902] AC 83 HL (Eng).
Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd & Others (1972) [1973] AC 360 HL (Eng).
Elder v Elder Watson (1951) [1952] SC 49.
Foss v Harbottle (1843), 67 ER 189.
MacDougall v Gardiner (1875), 1 Ch 13.
North-West Transportation Company Limited v Beatty [1887] 12 AC 589 HL (Eng).
Scottish Co-Operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1958] 3 All ER 66.

155

SECONDARY MATERIAL: MONOGRAPHS
Formoy, Ronald Ralph. The Historical Foundations of Modern Company Law (London UK:
Sweet& Maxwell, 1923).
Gower, LCB. The Principles of Modern Company Law, 3d ed (London UK: Stevens & Sons,
1969).
Holdsworth, WS. A History of English Law, vol 1 (London, UK: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1956).
SECONDARY MATERIAL: ARTICLES
Wedderburn, KW. “Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle” (1957)
Cambridge LJ 194
Wedderburn, KW. “Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule of Foss v Harbottle continued…”
(1958) Cambridge LJ 93-106.
Gower, LCB. “Some Contrasts between British and American corporate law” (1956) 69
Harv L Rev 1369 at 1371-72.
OTHER MATERIALS
CT Onions, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, vol 1 A-M, 3d
ed (London, UK: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1959) sub verbo “corporation”.

156

APPENDIX A
Predecessors of the Member’s Remedy Statutory Provisions

Section 210 of the 1948 Companies Act Section 111bis of the 1926 Union Companies
(England)
Act (South Africa)
Alternative remedy to winding up in cases of Alternative remedy to winding up in cases of
oppression
oppression
(1) Any member of a company who
complains that the affairs of the company
are being conducted in a manner oppressive
to some part of the members (including
himself) or, in a case falling within subsection
(3) of section one hundred and sixty-nine of
this Act, the Board of Trade, may make an
application to the court by petition for an
order under this section.

(1) Any member of a company who complains
in a manner oppressive to some part of the
members (including himself), may make an
application to the Court by petition of an
order under this section; and in a case falling
within subsection (2) of section ninety-five the
Minister may make like application.

Section 252(1) of the 1973 SA Companies Act was enacted as the reformed member’s
remedy provision from section 111bis of the 1926 Union Companies Act.
252. Member's remedy in case of oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct.
(1) Any member of a company who complains that any particular act or omission of a
company is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, or that the affairs of the company
are being conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him or to
some part of the members of the company, may, subject to the provisions of subsection
(2), make an application to the Court for an order under this section.
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